BEGIN:VCALENDAR
PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260606T144308Z
DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20120726T171500
DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20120726T181500
SUMMARY:Relativism\, Particularism and Reflective Equilibrium
UID:20260612T133154Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Australia/Melbourne
LOCATION:Old Quad Building\, University of Melbourne\, Melbourne\, Australia
DESCRIPTION:<p>Abstract:</p>\n<p>On my analysis\, the basic argument for epistemic relativism derives from the problem of the criterion that stems from ancient Pyrrhonian scepticism. Because epistemic relativism depends upon a sceptical strategy\, it is possible to respond to relativism on the basis of an anti-sceptical strategy. I argue that the particularist response to scepticism proposed by Roderick Chisholm may be combined with a naturalistic and reliabilist conception of epistemic warrant as the basis for a satisfactory response to epistemic relativism. In this paper\, I both outline this particularist response to relativism\, and set the approach in contrast with reflective equilibrium approaches in epistemology. I also briefly explore the connection between the particularist response to relativism and G.E. Moore&rsquo\;s defence of an external world.</p>
ORGANIZER:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR
