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PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN
VERSION:2.0
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260607T014320Z
DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20170524T120000
DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20170524T140000
SUMMARY:On some recent attempts to deliver us from scepticism
UID:20260614T001947Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Australia/Melbourne
LOCATION:La Trobe University Plenty Road & Kingsbury Drive\, Melbourne\, Australia\, 3086
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Abstract</strong>: &nbsp\;</p>\n<p>How does one know one is not a brain in a vat\, with all one's experiences being induced in one by stimulation from a powerful computer? &nbsp\;And if one does not know this is not one's situation\, presumably one does not know any of the things we normally take ourselves to know\, like "there is a computer in front of me now". &nbsp\;So\, in crude form\, runs the BIV (brain-in-vat) argument for scepticism about our knowledge of the external world. &nbsp\;</p>\n<p>In this talk\, I discuss and respond to some of the recent objections that have been made to the BIV argument\, including&nbsp\;(1) doubts about the metaphysical possibility of the situation described by a sceptical hypothesis\; (2) the supposed inadmissibility of empirical evidence in connection with settling (1) above\; and (3) The claim that one&rsquo\;s sensory experience (e.g. that one has one&rsquo\;s hand before one&rsquo\;s face) is sufficient to (defeasibly) justify a corresponding belief (one&rsquo\;s belief that one&rsquo\;s hand is before one&rsquo\;s face). &nbsp\;I will also review recent discussion of the contention that as an explanatory hypothesis\, the BIV hypothesis is a less good explanation of our sensory experiences than the "real world" hypothesis.&nbsp\;</p>
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