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PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN
VERSION:2.0
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260404T011254Z
DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20170428T103000
DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20170428T120000
SUMMARY:​The logic of permissible action
UID:20260404T044258Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-4s97k
TZID:Australia/Melbourne
LOCATION:Monash University\, Clayton\, Australia\, 3800
DESCRIPTION:<p>Abstract: For orthodox consequentialists\, an act is&nbsp\;permissible just in case it is morally best (say\, relative to one&sup1\;s&nbsp\;evidential&nbsp\;standpoint). For deontologists\, on the other hand\, permissibility is a&nbsp\;distinct&nbsp\;category: An act is permissible just in case it is good enough\, where some&nbsp\;permissible acts are morally better than others. My starting point is that&nbsp\;this&nbsp\;latter\, distinct notion of permissibility is important for any nuanced&nbsp\;account&nbsp\;of ethical action\; so the relevant debates within deontology are&nbsp\;instructive.&nbsp\;One prominent dispute is whether permissibility is solely about the&nbsp\;objective&nbsp\;features of an act\, or whether the reasoning of the actor herself affects&nbsp\;whether her act is permissible. While the latter has some prominent&nbsp\;defenders&nbsp\;(esp. McMahan 2009)\, it is widely criticized for being mistakenly&nbsp\;inward-looking or else focused on assessments of character rather than&nbsp\;action.&nbsp\;Here I defend a version of the &OElig\;inward looking&sup1\; account of permissible&nbsp\;action:&nbsp\;In short\, permissibility is conditional on an agent&sup1\;s particular epistemic&nbsp\;and evaluative attitudes. More generally\, I&nbsp\;defend a &OElig\;subvaluational&sup1\; logic of permissible action.</p>
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