David Hume&rsquo\;s core empiricist principle says that all thoughts (&ldquo\;ideas&rdquo\;) ultimately acquire their content from prior experiences (&ldquo\;impressions&rdquo\;)\, and thus his account of the mind is often said to be reductively naturalistic and individualistic. \; Recent work on Hume\, however\, by Garrett (2014)\, Schafer (2013\, 2017)\, and myself (2015) has emphasized the role of language in his account of representation. \; In the case of general ideas\, for example\, Hume indicates that every impression is completely determinate and thus every idea\, being copied from impressions\, should also be completely determinate. \; Yet we can think general thoughts. \; His resolution of this paradox is to appeal to the imagination&rsquo\;s associations. \; We think a general thought by thinking of a particular and being disposed to think of other particulars in the same class\, where a linguistic term triggers and controls this disposition. \; The rules of language thus dictate whether it is right to associate\, say\, an idea of a particular poodle with the idea of a particular Airedale (but not with the idea of a particular shoe or stone) when thinking of dogs-in-general. \; For Hume\, the social and normative structures of language give our concepts a social and normative dimension.
\n\nI point to Hume&rsquo\;s claim that &ldquo\;without a fiction&rdquo\; ideas can only represent the content they inherit from impressions (Treatise 1.2.3.11) to argue that general ideas qualify as fictions and that the core Humean fictions &ndash\; of the self and of external objects &ndash\; can be understood through language-involving mechanisms similar to those at work in general ideas. \; I conclude that\, for Hume\, all of our core thoughts are social and normative in structure.
\n\nHume\, however\, does not give a full explanation of language. \; The most significant discussion occurs in Book 3 of the Treatise where Hume analogizes the &ldquo\;artifices&rdquo\; or conventions that establish property to those that establish a language. \; Unfortunately\, Hume&rsquo\;s account of the obligations involved in obeying the rules of property are far from clear\, and thus his appeal to language to explain our fundamental beliefs might seem similarly unclear. \; I investigate Darwall&rsquo\;s (1995)\, Cohon&rsquo\;s (1997\, 2008)\, and Garrett&rsquo\;s (2007) attempts to explain how Hume understands the artificiality of justice\, and suggest that each fails for a common reason. \; They overlook the fact that\, for Hume\, &ldquo\;just acts&rdquo\; are not a discrete category in need of a particular motivation. \; Rather\, justice ultimately concerns our motivations simply excluding violations of others&rsquo\; property rights without our ever thinking in those terms. \; I suggest that a similar analysis explains our obedience to the rules of language.
\n\n\nFinally\, I compare my account of our following linguistic rules with Schafer&rsquo\;s (2017) argument that Hume ultimately uses moral concepts to account for linguistic propriety. \; While I agree that some language-involving traits (such as glibness or eloquence) will count as virtues or vices in Hume&rsquo\;s broad conception of morality\, the basic rule-following character of everyday linguistic practices is not moralized.
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