BEGIN:VCALENDAR PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN VERSION:2.0 CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260605T062346Z DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20170831T121500 DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20170831T141500 SUMMARY:The Puzzle of Cognitive Phenomenology UID:20260607T093820Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm TZID:Australia/Melbourne LOCATION:The University of Melbourne\, Parkville\, Australia\, 3010 DESCRIPTION:

What is the nature of conscious thought? Answers to this question cluster into two groups. According to a position that I dub &lsquo\;phenomenal conservatism&rsquo\;\, the phenomenal character of thought is restricted to that of the sensory and affective states that accompany thought. According to a view I dub &lsquo\;phenomenal liberalism&rsquo\;\, thought is characterized by a distinctive range of phenomenal properties&mdash\;what we might call &lsquo\;cognitive phenomenological properties&rsquo\;. The debate between conservatives and liberals generates a puzzle\, for we cannot account for it without rejecting one (or more) prima facie plausible claim about consciousness. I argue that this debate is best explained by supposing that conservatives and liberals are operating with different notions of &lsquo\;phenomenal consciousness&rsquo\;. This result is an important one\, for it calls into question the widespread assumption that there is a unitary notion of phenomenal consciousness at work in the philosophy of mind.

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