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PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260605T232556Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Dublin:20170928T130000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Dublin:20170928T143000
SUMMARY:The Intersubjective Conditions of Normative Agency
UID:20260610T074437Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Europe/Dublin
LOCATION:Belfield\, Ireland\, Dublin 4
DESCRIPTION:<p>Abstract:&nbsp\;In this paper I consider Levinas&rsquo\; claim that full-fledged agency requires the recognition of second-person authority. I do so by comparing Levinas and Korsgaard on the kind of critical distance that both posit as a necessary condition for the possibility of norm-responsive agency.&nbsp\;Contra Korsgaard\, I will argue that distance from one&rsquo\;s incentives can only be <em> critical</em> in the required way insofar as an agent is forced to confront a demand for justification\; a demand whose condition of possibility is a perspective outside the confines of the agent&rsquo\;s own projects. As such\, Korsgaard&rsquo\;s version of constitutivism &ndash\; whereby a robust moral normativity is purportedly derived simply from the constitutive norms of agency as such &ndash\; cannot be the whole story. The question remains\, however\, whether Levinas can fill the gap.</p>\n\n
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