BEGIN:VCALENDAR
PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260605T054707Z
DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20171006T103000
DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20171006T120000
SUMMARY:Consciousness as a Natural Kind 
UID:20260607T080813Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Australia/Melbourne
LOCATION:Monash University\, Clayton\, Australia\, 3800
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Abstract</strong></p>\n\n<p>One of the central challenges facing the science of consciousness is that of validating putative measures of consciousness. It has recently been suggested that it might be possible to meet this challenge by treating consciousness as a natural kind\, and to validate putative measures of consciousness in the way that putative measures of other natural kinds have been validated. Indeed\, the natural kind methodology is so prima facie compelling that it is something of a puzzle as to why it has been neglected by both scientists and philosophers. This paper considers a cluster of objections to the natural kind approach that centre on the idea that the natural kind approach is undermined by features of the concept of consciousness. </p>\n\n<p><strong>Reading: </strong></p>\n\n<p>Goff\, P. 2011.&nbsp\; A priori physicalists get out phenomenal concepts wrong. <em>Australasian</em> <em>Journal of Philosophy</em>\, 89/2: 191-209.</p>\n\n<p>Shea\, N. &amp\; Bayne\, T. 2010. The vegetative state and the science of consciousness\, <em>British Journal for the Philosophy of Science</em>\, 61: 459-84.</p>
ORGANIZER:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR