BEGIN:VCALENDAR
PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260618T020042Z
DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20171004T113000
DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20171004T133000
SUMMARY:Material contribution\, responsibility\, and liability
UID:20260618T052111Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Australia/Melbourne
LOCATION:Royal Parade\, Melbourne\, Australia\, 3010
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Abstract</strong><br></p>\n<p>In her important recent work\, Helen Frowe defends the view that<br> bystanders&mdash\;those who do not pose threats to others&mdash\;cannot be liable to<br> being harmed in self-defense or in defense of others. On her account\,<br> harming bystanders always infringes their rights against being harmed\,<br> since they have not acted in any way to forfeit them. According to<br> Frowe\, harming bystanders can be justified only when it constitutes a<br> lesser evil.&nbsp\; Here I make the case that some bystanders can indeed be<br> liable to harm. They can be liable\, I will argue\, because they can be<br> morally responsible for threats of harm\, and in becoming responsible<br> they can forfeit their rights. While bystanders do cannot be<br> responsible for initiating threats\, they can become responsible for<br> the persistence for threats\, and for culpably failing to prevent them<br> from being initiated in the first place.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Holly Lawford-Smith:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR
