BEGIN:VCALENDAR
PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260409T002432Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Dublin:20130405T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Dublin:20130406T180000
SUMMARY:Dublin Philosophy Graduate Conference: Perception and Understanding 
UID:20260409T235129Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-r5qzs
TZID:Europe/Dublin
LOCATION:Dublin\, Ireland
DESCRIPTION:<p>The philosophy departments of Trinity College and University College Dublin&nbsp\;will host the annual Dublin Philosophy Graduate Conference on the 5th and&nbsp\;6th of April\, 2013. The theme will be &lsquo\;perception and understanding&rsquo\;\, and&nbsp\;the keynote speakers will be Professor Kenneth Westphal from the University&nbsp\;of East Anglia\, Norwich and James O&rsquo\;Shea from the University College Dublin.&nbsp\;&nbsp\;Graduate students working in relevant fields are warmly invited to submit&nbsp\;their work for presentation during the conference.<br><br>The relationship between perception and understanding is crucial for our&nbsp\;intelligent engagement in the world around us. Kant went further to say&nbsp\;that we would have no self-conscious experience without the cooperation of&nbsp\;our perceptual capacities and our conceptual capacities. &nbsp\;For Kant and&nbsp\;Hegel\, and more recently\, for Sellars and McDowell\, clarifying the&nbsp\;relationship between our mutually dependent capacities for rational judgment&nbsp\;and for sense perception is integral to understanding not simply how our&nbsp\;categorial thought is rationally constrained\, but how we think determinately&nbsp\;at all.<br><br>Would a satisfactory account of the relationship between our perceptual and&nbsp\;judgmental capacities enable us to make sense of intentionality for rational&nbsp\;subjects? &nbsp\;Without such an account of intentionality\, are there alternative&nbsp\;ways to explain thought&rsquo\;s answerability to the world? &nbsp\;For sense experience&nbsp\;to justify rather than merely cause belief\, for it to function normatively&nbsp\;like this\, it seems that it must\, on the one hand\, be receptive so that it&nbsp\;opens us up to the world\; and it must\, on the other hand\, be categorically formed\, i.e.\, formed in a manner that opens us as rational beings up to the&nbsp\;world. &nbsp\;In a word\, it seems that perceptual capacities and judgmental&nbsp\;capacities must cooperate. &nbsp\;So how does our embodiment shape our<br>understanding? &nbsp\;And in what ways does our understanding constitute our&nbsp\;embodied experience?<br><br>We might\, nevertheless\, wonder whether the relationship between perception&nbsp\;and understanding is as crucial as some have made it out to be. First\, if&nbsp\;we uphold a broadly Kantian view\, then what should we make of the ability to&nbsp\;respond intelligently to things without having the relevant concepts in play&nbsp\;while doing so? &nbsp\;Animals and children seem to do this routinely. &nbsp\;Second\, it&nbsp\;seems that hallucinations are cases of conceptually structured perceptual&nbsp\;experiences in which we are not &lsquo\;open&rsquo\; to the world. Third\, maybe concepts&nbsp\;can actually obscure what is given in experience. &nbsp\;Even when one&rsquo\;s&nbsp\;experience is shaped by the right concepts of what is given in experience\,&nbsp\;one&rsquo\;s experience can be shaped like this for the wrong reasons\, such as\,&nbsp\;irrational prejudices.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Given our intelligent engagement with the world around us\, it seems that&nbsp\;perception and understanding must largely converge. But given (inter alia)&nbsp\;that we can continually misunderstand and reinterpret what was anyway given\,&nbsp\;what was anyway perceived\, and given that some individuals can be said to&nbsp\;perceive without the relevant concepts at play and likewise without the&nbsp\;capacity to make the relevant judgments\, it seems that perception and&nbsp\;understanding must largely diverge.</p>\n<p>Conference Schedule:<br><br>Friday<br><br>10.00-11.30 Plenary: Kenneth Westphal\, University of East Anglia\, Mutual<br>Recognition and Rational Justification in Substantive Domains<br></p>\n<p>12.00-13.00 Jo&atilde\;o Santos\, University of Porto\, Disjunctivism\, Scepticism and<br>the Transcendental<br></p>\n<p>14.30-15.30 Thomas Whyman\, University of Essex\, Taking a Stance on the World<br></p>\n<p>15.30-16.30 Joseph Cunningham\, University of Warwick\, Perceiving Isn't Believing<br></p>\n<p>17.00-18.00 Raney Folland\, San Francisco State University\, Doxastic<br>Attitudes Governed by a Principle of Coherence<br><br>Saturday<br><br>10.00-11.30 Plenary: Jim O'Shea\, University College Dublin\, Sellars' Defence<br>of Nonconceptual Content<br></p>\n<p>12.00-13.00 Lorcan Whitehead\, University of Essex\, Re-Minding Merleau-Ponty<br></p>\n<p>14.00-15.00 Carli Coenen\, University of Nijmegan\, Perceptual Experience as<br>Bodily Synthesis<br></p>\n<p>15.00-16.00 Daniel Kodaj\, Central European University\, Constitutive Concepts<br>and the Manifest Image<br></p>\n<p>16.30-17.30 Paul Giladi\, University of Sheffield\, Hegel on Thought and<br>Experience<br><br>Contact:&nbsp\;dublingradconf@gmail.com.</p>
ORGANIZER:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR
