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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260501T211711Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20121207T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20121207T090000
SUMMARY:Consciousness and Intentionality. Franz Brentano's Heritage in the Philosophy of Mind
UID:20260505T210541Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-6b96c54f56-bljdq
TZID:Europe/London
LOCATION:erzabt-Klotz-Straße 1\, Salzburg\, Austria\, 5020
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Confirmed Speakers:<br></strong></p>\n<p>Mauro Antonelli (University of Milan-Bicocca)<br>Wilhelm Baumgartner (University of W&uuml\;rzburg)<br>Thomas Binder (University of Graz)<br>Johannes Brandl (University of Salzburg)<br>Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (University of Szeczin)<br>Tim Crane (University of Cambridge)<br>Barry Dainton (University of Liverpool)<br>Denis Fisette (University of Quebec at Montreal)<br>Robin Rollinger (University of Salzburg)<br>Mark Textor (King's College London)&nbsp\;</p>\n\n<p><strong>Organiser:<br></strong>Guillaume Fr&eacute\;chette (University of Salzburg)</p>\n<p>The famous intentionality quote from Brentano&rsquo\;s <em>Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint</em> gave rise to many different glosses on how to understand what is meant by intentionality. Since Chisholm\, Quine\, and Davidson\, the passage has often been referred to as making a claim about the irreducibility of the mental to the physical\, turning Brentano&rsquo\;s thesis that intentionality is the mark of the mental into a thesis about the peculiar idiom or vocabulary of the mental &ndash\; a thesis about intensionality. However\, in recent contributions to the philosophy of mind\, the reception of Brentano&rsquo\;s philosophy of mind has departed to a large extent from this first reception of the intentionality thesis. Interestingly\, his conception of intentionality and consciousness has been integrated into diverse and sometimes competing accounts of the mind:&nbsp\; higher-order theories of consciousness\, self-representational accounts and varieties of representationalism and intentionalism often relate to Brentano&rsquo\;s conception of the mind.</p>\n<p>This conference will deal with these multiple intersections between Franz Brentano&rsquo\;s philosophy and the contemporary philosophy of mind\, taking into consideration issues related &ndash\; among others &ndash\; to Brentano&rsquo\;s psychology\, ontology\, and theory of knowledge. Questions to be addressed may include &ndash\; but are not limited to &ndash\; phenomenal intentionality\, internalism\, non-conceptual content\, disjunctivism\, cognitive (and affective) phenomenology\, self-awareness and time-consciousness. Contributions may take various angles: they may address for instance Brentano&rsquo\;s conception of the mental from a critical\, historical and/or exegetical perspective\, or they may propose original accounts of intentionality and consciousness inspired by &ndash\; or critical of &ndash\; Brentano&rsquo\;s insights on that matter.</p>\n<p>Please send an abstract (max. 1000 words) <strong>before December 7</strong> using Easychair: <a href="https://www.easychair.org/conferences/?conf=brentano2013">https://www.easychair.org/conferences/?conf=brentano2013</a></p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Guillaume Frechette:
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