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PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN
VERSION:2.0
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260606T190704Z
DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20171020T103000
DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20171020T120000
SUMMARY:Shared Intentionality and the Cooperative Evolutionary Hypothesis
UID:20260613T063701Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Australia/Melbourne
LOCATION:Monash University\, Clayton\, Australia\, 3800
DESCRIPTION:<p>One important application of theories of collective intentionality is in contributing to explain the evolution of social understanding - and even of human thinking (Tomasello 2014).&nbsp\; A promising idea behind this approach is The Cooperative Evolutionary Hypothesis (CEH)\, namely\, the idea that&nbsp\;humans&rsquo\; capacity for social cooperation is at the heart of the capacity of the species to understand others&rsquo\; mental states and behaviour\, leading to an explanation of how humans came to share thoughts and language.&nbsp\;However\,&nbsp\;some of the most popular attempts to pursue CEH &nbsp\;face important problems.&nbsp\; In this talk\, I take Tomasello&rsquo\;s account (2016\,2014\, 2008) as a leading &nbsp\;example of a central&nbsp\;theoretical strand in the field that faces such&nbsp\;insurmountable problems.&nbsp\; I argue that Tomasello et al&rsquo\;s analysis of cooperation and spontaneous help is problematic.&nbsp\;Problems result from assuming that the right account of joint action and simple forms of shared intentionality is given by Bratman&rsquo\;s theory of shared intentions and its underlying assumptions.&nbsp\;&nbsp\;I end by proposing an alternative framework for understanding shared intentionality that can help&nbsp\;substantiate CEH. <br></p>
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