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VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260607T202536Z
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Taipei:20171103T113000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Taipei:20171103T133000
SUMMARY:The Metaphysics of Agency - Lecture II. Predication\, Propositions\, Events\, Situations\, Et Cetera!
UID:20260616T160845Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Asia/Taipei
LOCATION:No.18\, SiYuan St.\, Zhongzheng Dist.\, Taipei City\, Taiwan\, 100
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>The Metaphysics of Agency</strong></p>\n<p>[Abstract]</p>\n<p>There is agency\, one might say\, when something does something. A something that does things&mdash\;an agent&mdash\;may be a person\, a non-human animal\, or an inanimate object. Things that may be done by something are many and various (exactly the range of do-able things evidently depends upon the sort of agent in question). In the course of these lectures I introduce\, and attempt to answer\, a variety of inter-related metaphysical questions that arise in connection with agency &ndash\; whether\, human\, animal or inanimate. I suggest that a correct philosophy of mind requires a correct understanding of causality\, and that this is an understanding best brought to the fore by considering what agency itself (in any of its varieties) involves.</p>\n\n<p><strong>Lecture II. Predication\, Propositions\, Events\, Situations\, Et Cetera!</strong></p>\n<p>3 November (Friday) 15:30 p.m.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>[Abstract]</p>\n<p>I ask how we should understand &ldquo\;things that are done&rdquo\;\; and I consider notions of event (/action) and of process (/activity)\, and how they relate to one another. Turning specifically to the question of human agency\, I reflect on the question what sort of &ldquo\;contents&rdquo\; of mental states are needed in understanding it. I mean to cast doubt on the extent to which the idea of a proposition can provide a satisfactory conception of &ldquo\;content&rdquo\; in general. And I argue specifically against the widespread idea that such mental states as occur in explanations of action all have propositional contents.</p>
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