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\nInternational Symposium: Body schema and body image
\nMarch 24-25\, 2018
\nThe University of Tokyo (Komaba Campus)\, Japan
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\n[Call for Papers] \;
\nDeadline for Abstract Submissions: January 24th\, 2018 \;
\nNotification of Acceptance: January 31st\, 2018 \;
\nThe distinction between body image and body schema is a long-standing as well as a modern issue in diverse research fields related to embodiment. Looking back at its history\, the concept of body schema was first introduced to neurology in the early 20th century (e.g.\, Head &\; Holmes\, 1911). Diverse disturbances in sensory-motor activities resulting from neural and brain lesions were successfully described by using this concept. Phantom limbs\, asomatognosia\, apraxia and other symptoms have been explicated in terms of body schema. It also developed as a psychological concept related to wider problems such as schizophrenia\, anorexia\, depersonalization\, and body dysmorphic disorder among others (e.g.\, Schilder\, 1935). Both ideas are rich in their potential to explicate diverse phenomena in neuroscience\, psychology\, psychiatry\, cognitive science\, sports science and other related fields. \;
\nHowever\, several books and papers (e.g.\, Gallagher\, 2005\; de Preester &\; Knockaert\, 2005\; de Vignemont\, 2010) have indicated that the lack of theoretical distinction between body schema and body image has resulted in conceptual confusion in research. Ian Waterman&rsquo\;s unique story of deafferentation was one of the cases that gave us an opportunity to consider this issue along with a concrete phenomenon. Although body schema and body image have become one of the most frequently used concepts in interdisciplinary research on embodiment\, there still remains many questions including\;
\n- Is this distinction based on differences between conscious access (body image) and unconscious organization (body schema)?
\n- Is the distinction based on differences between perception (body image) and movement (body schema)? \;
\n- Are there other factors that facilitate clear distinctions? \;
\n- Is the distinction theoretical rather than empirical? Or vice versa?
\n- If the distinction is theoretical\, how would it be related to the concrete phenomenon of embodiment? And if it is empirical\, how far can it be elaborated theoretically? \;
\nWhatever the answers might be\, we believe that it is important to reconsider the distinction between body schema and body image within the context of the concrete phenomena of embodiment. In this symposium\, we welcome papers that address questions relevant to the above-mentioned questions and will try to explicate a concrete phenomenon based on the notion of body schema or body image\, as well as attempt to newly expand concepts regarding body representation including body schema and body image. Moreover\, after the symposium\, well-prepared presentations will be published as book chapters edited by the organizers of the conference. \;
\nPlease send your proposal (with title\, abstract of approx. 300 words\, name\, and affiliation) either to Dr. Yochai Ataria or to Dr. Shogo Tanaka. \;
\n[Keynote Address]
\nShaun Gallagher (University of Memphis): Lillian and Morrie Moss Professor of Excellence at the University of Memphis. His areas of research include phenomenology and the cognitive sciences\, especially topics related to embodiment\, self\, agency and intersubjectivity\, hermeneutics\, and the philosophy of time. His recent publications include Enactivist Interventions: Rethinking the Mind. (Oxford University Press\, 2017) and many other articles. \;
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\n[Organizers]
\nYochai Ataria\, Ph. D. (yochai.ataria@gmail.com)
\nShogo Tanaka\, Ph. D. (shg.tanaka@gmail.com) \; \;
ORGANIZER;CN=Yochai Ataria;CN=Shogo Tanaka: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR