BEGIN:VCALENDAR PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN VERSION:2.0 CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20240328T164940Z DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20180309T060000 DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20180309T080000 SUMMARY:Putting Frege’s Puzzle to Kripke’s Test UID:20240328T165409Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-6f97df9687-7c6q9 TZID:Australia/Melbourne LOCATION:Old Arts\, Parkville\, Australia\, 3010 DESCRIPTION:
Jonathan Berg (Haifa) will present "Putting Frege&rsquo\;s Puzzle to Kripke&rsquo\;s Test" at 11 on 9 March in Old Arts 156. \;
\nABSTRACT:
\nSaul Kripke proposes the following test:
\nIf someone alleges that a certain phenomenon in English is a counterexample to a given analysis\, consider a hypothetical language which (as much as possible) is like English except that the analysis is \;stipulated \;to be correct. \; \;Imagine such a hypothetical language introduced into a community and spoken by it. \; \;If the phenomenon in question would still arise in a community that spoke such a hypothetical language (which may not be English)\, then the fact that it arises in English cannot disprove the hypothesis that the analysis is correct for English." \;("Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference\," \; \;Midwest Studies in Philosophy\, \;2 (1977)\, 255-76.)
\nFrege&mdash\;or at least\, some Fregeans&mdash\;argue that substitution failure of coreferential names in belief contexts disproves the theory of direct reference. How well does the Fregean objection hold up to Kripke&rsquo\;s test? And how much does it matter?
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