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VERSION:2.0
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260605T002332Z
DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20180425T120000
DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20180425T133000
SUMMARY:Shared Belief and the Limits of Empathy
UID:20260606T204340Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Australia/Melbourne
LOCATION:University of Melbourne\, Melbourne\, Australia
DESCRIPTION:(This paper is co-authored by Monika Betzler and Simon Keller\, and will be presented by Simon Keller).<br>\n<br>\nTo empathize with another person is to share in her feelings or emotions. Emotions involve ways of seeing the world\; fear of cats\, for example\, involves seeing cats as dangerous. To empathize with another person is\, in part\, to see the world as she sees it.&nbsp\;Empathy\, as a result\, often places rational pressure upon beliefs\; if I empathize with your fear of cats\, then I come under rational pressure to believe that cats are dangerous. The connection between&nbsp\;empathy&nbsp\;and belief has far-reaching consequences for several debates about the moral and epistemic roles of&nbsp\;empathy.&nbsp\;Empathy&nbsp\;carries distinctive epistemic dangers along with its epistemic benefits\; there can be good reasons to avoid&nbsp\;empathy\; there are epistemic barriers to our ability truly to empathize with others\, even those very close to us\; the ideal of universal&nbsp\;empathy&nbsp\;is incoherent\; and&nbsp\;empathy cannot plausibly be taken to be the basis of morality.
ORGANIZER;CN=Holly Lawford-Smith;CN=Richard Rowland:
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