BEGIN:VCALENDAR PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN VERSION:2.0 CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260606T025508Z DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20180502T120000 DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20180502T133000 SUMMARY:Incentivizing Epistemic Caution UID:20260610T180249Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm TZID:Australia/Melbourne LOCATION:University of Melbourne\, Melbourne\, Australia DESCRIPTION:

Norms concerning how to attribute responsibility for harms play at least some role in incentivising behaviour. That is\, \;retrospective \;responsibility attributions do/should affect our \;prospective \;deliberations about how to act. This creates a prima facie puzzle in cases where the responsibility incentives are intuitively compelling\, yet do not apparently line up with the right moral choices. Individuals are then incentivised to act wrongly! To show the plausibility of this scenario\, I appeal to the &lsquo\;causal relevance condition&rsquo\; for attributing responsibility for harm\, and how particular versions of this condition arguably lead the individual astray in special types of decision situations&mdash\;those involving &lsquo\;many hands&rsquo\;. A tempting response is to reform either the conditions for responsibility or else the account of right choice\, so that the two are in sync. The better response\, I claim\, is to recognise that responsibility norms can serve as a &lsquo\;group correction&rsquo\; to individual deliberations in at least two ways: i) by reconfiguring otherwise tragic collective-action problems\, and ii) by imposing a policy of epistemic caution regarding the predicted consequences of one&rsquo\;s actions.

ORGANIZER;CN=Holly Lawford-Smith;CN=Richard Rowland: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR