BEGIN:VCALENDAR PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN VERSION:2.0 CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260606T153637Z DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20180412T121500 DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20180412T141500 SUMMARY:Epistemic Worth UID:20260612T183957Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm TZID:Australia/Melbourne LOCATION:The University of Melbourne\, Melbourne\, Australia\, 3010 DESCRIPTION:

It is right for a person to believe a proposition if and only if that proposition is true. On this view\, truth is a norm for belief. Some\, myself included\, go further and suggest that truth is the \;fundamental \;norm for belief\, relative to which other norms governing belief are derivative. Call this \;the truth view. In a recent paper\, Clayton Littlejohn objects to the truth view on the grounds that it cannot explain why epistemic evaluation has an &lsquo\;inward-looking focus&rsquo\;\, that is\, why it concerns a person&rsquo\;s reasons for believing. He takes this not only to undermine the truth view but also to motivate \;the knowledge view\, associated with Timothy Williamson\, according to which knowledge is the fundamental norm for belief. In this paper\, I show that \;the truth view can account for the 'inward-looking focus' of epistemic evaluation. In doing so\, I draw on some ideas \;from moral philosophy\, specifically\, ideas about moral worth. \;This provides a defence of the truth view and blocks a route to the knowledge view. In addition\, it also delivers \;an account of epistemic evaluation which reveals it to \;mirror - in structure\, not substance - moral evaluation.

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