BEGIN:VCALENDAR
PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260604T190301Z
DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20180517T121500
DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20180517T141500
SUMMARY:Normative Concepts and Action-Guidingness
UID:20260606T163547Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Australia/Melbourne
LOCATION:University of Melbourne\, Melbourne\, Australia\, 3010
DESCRIPTION:<p>Core normative concepts\, such as&nbsp\;morally right&nbsp\;or&nbsp\;all-told right\, play a characteristic&nbsp\;<em>action-guiding role</em>: rational agents attempt to conform their intentions and actions to judgments deploying these concepts. Many metaethicists have appealed to this action-guiding role in order to challenge cognitivist and naturalist approaches to normative judgments and normative concepts. In doing so\, they have typically relied on very schematic characterizations of the action-guiding role of normative concepts.</p>\n<p>In this paper\, we clarify the nature of the action-guiding role of normative concepts\, highlighting the distinctive phenomenology and egocentric character of paradigmatic normative judgments. We also show how these distinctive features don&rsquo\;t threaten metaethical cognitivism and naturalism.</p>
ORGANIZER:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR
