BEGIN:VCALENDAR PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN VERSION:2.0 CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260502T172012Z DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20180523T103000 DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20180523T120000 SUMMARY:Doxasticism: Belief and the Information-Responsiveness of Mind UID:20260507T183644Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-6b96c54f56-bljdq TZID:Australia/Melbourne LOCATION:Monash University\, Clayton\, Australia\, 3800 DESCRIPTION:

Our beliefs are a map of our world. They shape our hopes\, direct our desires and intentions\, and structure our values. They are multifarious\, having a vast range of propositional contents and many kinds of non-propositional objects. \; They may be about abstract entities\; they may be directly about the world of our experience&mdash\;thus causally connected with external objects&mdash\;or may concern elements internal to the mind. \; Beliefs also differ from one another psychologically: in strength\, influence on behavior\, and accessibility to consciousness. \; Normatively\, they differ in how well-grounded they are. \; This paper concerns a problem that has received insufficient analysis in the philosophical literature so far: the conditions under which an information-bearing state&mdash\;say a perception or a recollection&mdash\;yields belief. \; The paper distinguishes between belief and a psychological property easily conflated with belief\, illustrates the tendency of philosophers to overlook this distinction\, and offers a positive conception of the mind&rsquo\;s information-responsiveness that does not require as much belief-formation&mdash\;doxastic uptake\, if you like&mdash\;as has been commonly supposed to be produced by perception and other experiences. \; This conception is clarified by a partial sketch of the natural economy of mind. \; The paper then considers whether the economical view proposed requires abandoning the venerable belief-desire conception of intentional action\, and\, in the concluding section\, suggests some ways in which intellectual responsibility is both clarified and extended by the overall work of the paper.

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