BEGIN:VCALENDAR PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN VERSION:2.0 CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20261001T044140Z DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20181004T121500 DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20181004T141500 SUMMARY:Conceptuality and Mathematical Thinking in Aristotle: An Ancient Intervention into the McDowell-Dreyfus debate UID:20261007T145210Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:ac83:5bff:fea0:108%3 TZID:Australia/Melbourne LOCATION:The University of Melbourne\, Melbourne\, Australia DESCRIPTION:

John McDowell and Hubert Dreyfus argue that human beings have a capacity for &lsquo\;situation-specific skilful coping&rsquo\;. Both claim that they are articulating Aristotle&rsquo\;s notion of \;phronÄ“sis \;or practical wisdom. And both insist that it is best understood as a kind of perceptual capacity. They disagree\, however\, about whether it is a form of conceptual rationality. I argue that neither provides an \;accurate analysis of Aristotle\, \;but I consider whether there are textual grounds for extending Aristotle&rsquo\;s position to include McDowell&rsquo\;s idea that \;conceptuality is a rational capacity that informs perceptual experience. I derive an account from Aristotle&rsquo\;s debate with Plato on the nature and presuppositions of counting. \;This debate fundamentally concerns the boundary conditions for rationality. I argue that their differences imply distinct models of perceptual activity and I give reasons to think that Aristotle&rsquo\;s position corresponds broadly to that of McDowell. It has a problem\, however. It implies that animals cannot perceive\, or not in the same way as human beings\, and there is reason to think that Aristotle thinks their perceptual capacities are functionally similar. I conclude by proposing a solution that is inspired by Plato&rsquo\;s views about the role of calculation in resolving inconsistencies in perception.

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