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VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260914T070225Z
DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Adelaide:20180907T110000
DTEND;TZID=Australia/Adelaide:20180907T130000
SUMMARY:Problems of Precision in Bayesian Epistemology and Fuzzy Theories of Vagueness
UID:20260914T131326Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:20f6:41ff:fe59:be4a%3
TZID:Australia/Adelaide
LOCATION:North Terrace\, Adelaide\, Australia\, 5005
DESCRIPTION:A common objection to theories of vagueness based on fuzzy logics centres on the idea that assigning a single numerical degree of&nbsp\;truth &ndash\; a real number between 0 and 1 &ndash\; to each vague statement is excessively precise. &nbsp\;A common objection to Bayesian&nbsp\;epistemology centres on the idea that assigning a single numerical degree of belief &ndash\; a real number between 0 and 1 &ndash\; to each&nbsp\;proposition is excessively precise. &nbsp\;In this talk I explore possible parallels between these objections. &nbsp\;In particular I argue that the only&nbsp\;good objection along these lines to fuzzy theories of vagueness does not translate into a good objection to Bayesian epistemology. &nbsp\;An&nbsp\;important part of my argument consists in drawing a distinction between two different notions of degree of belief\, which I call&nbsp\;dispositional degree of belief and epistemic degree of belief.\n&nbsp\;
ORGANIZER;CN=Philip Gerrans:
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