An important philosophical position holds that an agent&rsquo\;s moral integrity is entirely parasitic upon morality&rsquo\;s overall requirements. According to this &ldquo\;integrity skepticism\,&rdquo\; we can only know what our moral integrity requires once we know how\, all things considered\, we morally ought to act. In this essay&rsquo\;s opening part\, focused on individual ethics\, I present two main arguments against integrity skepticism. The first argument is that since agents have important moral reasons to incorporate certain unconditional commitments into their self-conception\, it is unfair to criticize agents who go on to treat these commitments as an independent factor in their moral deliberation. The second argument links agents&rsquo\; unconditional moral commitments to their duty to sustain self-respect.
\n\nIn the essay&rsquo\;s latter part\, I seek to show that parallel versions of these two arguments provide even stronger grounds for resisting integrity skepticism regarding collective affairs. Specifically\, I contend that integrity skepticism fails when it comes to liberal-democratic polities as collective agents: such polities have their own morally important integrity\, which is not parasitic upon them &ldquo\;doing the right thing.&rdquo\; Rather\, a liberal polity&rsquo\;s moral integrity is an independent moral factor informing the analysis of what the polity ought to do.
ORGANIZER;CN=Philip Gerrans: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR