Abstract:
\nInstead of asserting ¬\;P\, we could deny P. This has been overlooked as an alternative to assertion partly because Frege and others accept the equivalences: 1) between Assertion: [¬\;P] and Denial: [P]\, and 2) between Assertion: [P] and Denial: [¬\;P]. But these are not equivalences. Assertion and denial play different functions. Assertion aims at truth\, commits to a way the world is and expresses a judgment. In contrast\, denial aims at falsehood\, makes no commitment to a way the world is\, withholds judgment and is conventionally responsive. A denial is not\, then\, the same as an assertion of a negation. That Frege&rsquo\;s logic contains an assertion stroke but not a denial stroke is a case of affirmation bias. Recognition of the special role of denial can be useful to the Parmenidean\, whose aim is to avoid affirming negatives. \;
\nThe Speaker:
\nStephen Mumford is Professor of Metaphysics in the Department of Philosophy at Durham University. He is the author of \;Dispositions \;(Oxford\, 1998)\, \;Russell on Metaphysics (Routledge\, 2003)\, \;Laws in Nature \;(Routledge\, 2004)\, \;David Armstrong \;(Acumen\, 2007)\, \;Watching Sport: Aesthetics\, Ethics and Emotion \;(Routledge\, 2011)\, \;Getting Causes from Powers \;(Oxford\, 2011 with Rani Lill Anjum)\, \;Metaphysics: a Very Short Introduction \;(Oxford\, 2012)\, \;Causation: a Very Short Introduction \;(Oxford\, 2013\, with Anjum)\, Glimpse of Light \;(Bloomsbury\, 2017)\, \;What Tends to Be \;(Routledge\, 2018\, with Anjum) and \;Causation in Science \;(Oxford\, 2018\, with Anjum). His next book will be \;Football: the Philosophy Behind the Game \;(Polity\, 2019). He is currently working on a book on the metaphysics of absences\, which is under contract with Oxford University Press. \;
\nEveryone is welcome. Please send us an email to liva.rotkale@lu.lv if you would like to participate.
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