Enactivism has greatly benefitted contemporary philosophy by showing in detail how the traditional intellectualist &lsquo\;act-content&rsquo\; model of intentionality is simply insufficient both phenomenologically and naturalistically\, and minds are built from &lsquo\;operative intentionality&rsquo\; &ndash\; world-involving bodily habits. It has been assumed that this insight must entail non-representationalism concerning at least basic minds. But what if we could show that representation is itself a form of skilled performance? I sketch the beginnings of such an account\, drawing on Peirce&rsquo\;s pragmatic semiotics\, which understands signs as habits whose connections with rich schemas of possible experience render them subject to increasing degrees of self-control. This new framework\, I argue\, enables us to take a crack at the Information Processing Challenge (Hutto 2011)\, and offers the prospect of a new\, entirely habit-based epistemology.
\n\;
\nDr Cathy Legg is Senior Lecturer at Deakin University. She holds a BA (hons) from University of Melbourne\, a MA in Philosophy from \;Monash University \;and a PhD from \;ANU\, where her thesis (&ldquo\;Modes of Being&rdquo\;) concerned Charles Peirce&rsquo\;s philosophical categories. After a spell of hands-on ontological engineering she returned to academia. Her current research bridges philosophy of language\, logic\, pragmatism\, speculative metaphysics and &lsquo\;applied ontology&rsquo\;\, with particular recent focus on the Pittsburgh philosophical school.
ORGANIZER;CN=Jack Alan Reynolds: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR