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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260606T144002Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20190617T053000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20190618T130000
SUMMARY:Higher-Order Metaphysics
UID:20260612T132114Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Europe/London
LOCATION:Birmingham\, United Kingdom\, b15 2tt
DESCRIPTION:<p>The final two-day workshop of the AHRC-funded&nbsp\;Higher-Order Metaphysics&nbsp\;project will be on Monday 17 and Tuesday 18 June 2019.</p>\n<p>The workshop is free and open to all.There is no need to register\, but please let the organiser (Nick Jones\,&nbsp\;n.k.jones@bham.ac.uk) know if you&rsquo\;re planning on attending\, for catering purposes.</p>\n<p>All talks will be in the European Research Institute\, room G51&nbsp\;(building G3 on&nbsp\;this map)</p>\n<p><strong>Schedule</strong></p>\n<p>Monday 17 June</p>\n<p>0930-1045 &ndash\; Sam Roberts (Oslo): The Iterative Conception of Properties</p>\n<p>1100-1215 &ndash\; Agust&iacute\;n&nbsp\;Rayo (MIT): Strict&nbsp\;Contingentism</p>\n<p>1330-1445 &ndash\; Adam Murray (Manitoba): Propositional Dependence</p>\n<p>1500-1615 &ndash\; Jeremy Goodman (USC): The Undefinable</p>\n<p>1630-1745 &ndash\; Vera&nbsp\;Flocke (NYU): Metaphysical Lessons of Russell&rsquo\;s Paradox</p>\n<p>Tuesday 18 June</p>\n<p>1000-1115 &ndash\; Peter Fritz (Oslo): A Path To Worldliness</p>\n<p>1125-1240 &ndash\; Nicholas K Jones (Birmingham): Type-Neutrality and Pattern Recognition</p>\n<p>1345-1500 &ndash\; Gabriel&nbsp\;Uzquiano (USC): Impredicativity&nbsp\;and&nbsp\;Intensionality</p>\n<p>1515-1630 &ndash\; Rob&nbsp\;Trueman (York): Idealism and the Identity Theory of Truth</p>\n<p>Rayo&rsquo\;s abstract: I distinguish between strict and moderate contingentism\, and offer a formal semantics for the former.</p>\n<p>Fritz&rsquo\;s abstract: According to a familiar view\, propositions are individuated in terms of possible worlds: propositions are identical if they are true in the same worlds. One way of motivating this view is by appealing to desirable features such as consistency and usefulness. In this talk\, I will provide a more direct motivation for the possible-worlds view of propositions. This involves several steps. Some of them are well-known\, such as the observation that certain propositions play the role of possible worlds if propositions form a certain kind of structure (roughly\, a complete atomic Boolean algebra). Others will be new\, including some steps in an argument for the claim that propositions form such a structure.</p>\n<p>Trueman&rsquo\;s abstract: In a recent article\, Hofweber&nbsp\; presents a new\, and surprising\, argument for idealism. His argument is surprising because it starts with an apparently innocent premise from the philosophy of language: that 'that'-clauses do not refer. I do not think that Hofweber's argument works\, and my first aim in this talk is to explain why. However\, I entirely agree with Hofweber that what we say about 'that'-clauses can have important metaphysical consequences. My second aim is to argue that far from leading us into idealism\, denying that 'that'-clauses refer is the first step toward a kind of&nbsp\;<em>direct realism</em>&nbsp\;about belief.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Nicholas K. Jones:
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