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VERSION:2.0
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260606T161753Z
DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20190515T110000
DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20190515T130000
SUMMARY:Knowledge how and women surgeons’ experiences of epistemic injustice
UID:20260612T214418Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Australia/Melbourne
LOCATION:La Trobe University\, Melbourne\, Australia\, 3086
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Abstract</strong>: Theories of epistemic injustice have potential to illuminate a variety of real-world situations where harm results from misjudging the credibility of a knower. One such context is the workplace. In this talk I will explore the relevance of epistemic injustice to women surgeons&rsquo\; experiences of work\, drawing on data from an empirical interview study. I argue that epistemic injustice understood narrowly (as Miranda Fricker has described it\, focusing on testimonial and hermeneutical injustice) is only applicable to a fraction of the wrongs experienced by women surgeons in their capacity as knowers. One of the most significant limitations of Fricker&rsquo\;s account in this context is its intellectualism about knowledge. In surgery\, credibility tracks the skilled performance of the worker: the knowledge that matters most to patients (and employers such as hospitals) is not the surgeon&rsquo\;s propositional knowledge\, but their ability to enact knowledge of disease and anatomy through the successful hands-on performance of an operation. I argue that a non-intellectualist account of epistemic injustice could provide a more useful lens for understanding epistemic injustice in surgery\, and in many other workplaces. I finish with some reflections on what such an account would look like.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Yuri Cath:
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