BEGIN:VCALENDAR PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN VERSION:2.0 CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20240329T110807Z DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20190515T110000 DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20190515T130000 SUMMARY:Knowledge how and women surgeons’ experiences of epistemic injustice UID:20240329T110855Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-6f97df9687-7c6q9 TZID:Australia/Melbourne LOCATION:La Trobe University\, Melbourne\, Australia\, 3086 DESCRIPTION:
Abstract: Theories of epistemic injustice have potential to illuminate a variety of real-world situations where harm results from misjudging the credibility of a knower. One such context is the workplace. In this talk I will explore the relevance of epistemic injustice to women surgeons&rsquo\; experiences of work\, drawing on data from an empirical interview study. I argue that epistemic injustice understood narrowly (as Miranda Fricker has described it\, focusing on testimonial and hermeneutical injustice) is only applicable to a fraction of the wrongs experienced by women surgeons in their capacity as knowers. One of the most significant limitations of Fricker&rsquo\;s account in this context is its intellectualism about knowledge. In surgery\, credibility tracks the skilled performance of the worker: the knowledge that matters most to patients (and employers such as hospitals) is not the surgeon&rsquo\;s propositional knowledge\, but their ability to enact knowledge of disease and anatomy through the successful hands-on performance of an operation. I argue that a non-intellectualist account of epistemic injustice could provide a more useful lens for understanding epistemic injustice in surgery\, and in many other workplaces. I finish with some reflections on what such an account would look like.
ORGANIZER;CN=Yuri Cath: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR