BEGIN:VCALENDAR PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN VERSION:2.0 CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260430T171130Z DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20191011T103000 DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20191011T120000 SUMMARY:I\, Volkswagen UID:20260501T172820Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-6b96c54f56-bljdq TZID:Australia/Melbourne LOCATION:20 Chancellor's Walk\, Clayton\, Melbourne\, Australia\, 3800 DESCRIPTION:

Abstract: It has become almost platitudinous amongst philosophers that collective agents can be blameworthy for wrongdoing. However\, theorists of collectives' moral agency tend to take a functionalist approach\, on which collectives are moral agents in much the same way as complicated robots (some leading philosophers\, such as Christian List and Philip Pettit\, even defend collectives' agency \;by analogy \;to robots' agency). This is puzzling: we do not hold robots blameworthy \;when they cause harm. \;I suggest we don't hold robots blameworthy because \;robots cannot grasp their own agency from the first-personal standpoint. This raises the question of how collective agents can grasp their own agency. I give an account of how collectives can do this via their members\, so as to vindicate our social-political practice of blaming collectives.

ORGANIZER;CN=Jacqueline Broad: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR