BEGIN:VCALENDAR
PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260604T180048Z
DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20190906T070000
DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20190906T090000
SUMMARY:Agential Free Choice
UID:20260606T155748Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Australia/Melbourne
LOCATION:Old Arts\, Parkville\, Australia\, 3010
DESCRIPTION:<p>Melissa Fusco (Columbia) will present "Agential Free Choice" in Old Arts 224 at 11 on 6 September.</p>\n<p>Abstract: Agential Free Choice</p>\n<p>The Free Choice effect&mdash\;whereby&nbsp\;♢(p&nbsp\;or&nbsp\;q)&nbsp\;seems to entail both&nbsp\;♢p&nbsp\;and&nbsp\;♢q&mdash\;has long been described as a phenomenon affecting the deontic modal &ldquo\;may&rdquo\;. This paper presents an extension of the semantic account of deontic free choice defended in Fusco (2015) to the agentive modal &ldquo\;can&rdquo\;\, the &ldquo\;can&rdquo\; which\, intuitively\, describes an agent&rsquo\;s powers.</p>\n<p>I begin by sketching a model of inexact ability\, which grounds a modal approach to agency (Belnap &amp\; Perloff\, 1998\; Belnap et al.\, 2001) in a Williamson (1992\, 2014)-style margin of error. A classical propositional semantics combined with this framework can reflect the intuitions highlighted by Kenny (1976)&rsquo\;s much-discussed dartboard cases\, as well as the counterexamples to simple conditional views recently discussed by Mandelkern et al. (2017). In &sect\;3\, I substitute for classical disjunction an independently motivated generalization of Boolean join&mdash\;one which makes the two diagonally\, but not generally\, equivalent&mdash\;and show how it extends free choice inferences into a simple object language.</p>\n
ORGANIZER;CN=Shawn Standefer:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR