Abstract: Legal rights have a common conceptual structure. Across all areas of law\, this structure is visible but unobserved. By bringing this structure into view\, I aim\, like Hohfeld\, &ldquo\;to emphasize certain oft-neglected matters that may aid in the understanding an in the solution of practical\, every-day problems of the law.&rdquo\; My method for doing so\, however\, is different. Unlike Hohfeld\, I am not interested in distinguishing jural conceptual correlates\, or showing how such categories are misused by judges and lawyers. Nor am I concerned with the transcendent properties that makes one thing a &ldquo\;right&rdquo\; &ndash\; or even a legal right &ndash\; and another something else. My task\, instead\, is to trace the outlines of the internal structure of rights as they exist in modern Western legal systems. This requires a significant but\, in my view quite necessary\, assumption: that a legal right a is the ability to bring a successful claim in a court of law. Working with this assumption\, the conceptual structure emerges. Legal rights are triadic\, tiered\, causal\, and interactive. Using this conceptual apparatus\, I show how legal disputes are reducible to arguments about the integrity and composition of this structure. Additionally\, I show how placing arguments within this structure can illuminate answers to problems and suggest different questions to ask.
\nDavid A. Simon is a Visiting Assistant Professor at the University of Kansas School of Law and a Ph.D. candidate in law at the University of Cambridge\, where he is a Cambridge international scholar. His current projects examine author's rights in copyright\, trademark law &\; public safety\, and the influence of law professors&rsquo\; amici briefs on the Supreme Court. He holds an LL.M. from Harvard Law School\, a J.D. from the Chicago-Kent College of Law (High Honours\, Order of the Coif)\, and a B.A. from the University of Michigan (magna cum laude).
ORGANIZER;CN=Kenneth M. Ehrenberg: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR