BEGIN:VCALENDAR PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN VERSION:2.0 CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260604T195209Z DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20191115T103000 DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20191115T123000 SUMMARY:Phenomenal Powers: A New Response to Hume. UID:20260606T171120Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm TZID:America/New_York LOCATION:32 Vassar Street\, Cambridge\, United States DESCRIPTION:

"Hume argued that there are no causal powers\, at least not as far as we can know or positively conceive of\, because all causes are conceivable without their effects. But a seeming exception to this claim can be found in the realm of phenomenal properties: it is difficult to conceive of the feeling of pain making a subject who experiences it pursue it (or do anything else than avoid it)\, or the feeling of pleasure making a subject avoid it (or do anything else than pursue it)&mdash\;at least in the absence of interfering motives. These connections are standardly explained away as merely psychological\, as analytic or constitutive (as per analytic functionalism)\, or as merely normative. I will argue that they should rather be taken at face value: as indicating that phenomenal pain and pleasure truly necessitate their effects in a properly causal way\, and thereby constitute real\, irreducible causal powers. I will then suggest that this view supports a kind of panpsychism\, and that this is no reason to reject it."

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