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PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260914T151126Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/Chicago:20191010T233000
DTEND;TZID=America/Chicago:20191011T020000
SUMMARY:A Deflationary Account of Representation in Cognitive Science
UID:20260914T151126Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@fe80:0:0:0:dcf7:d8ff:fe11:7ebf%3
TZID:America/Chicago
LOCATION:1117 Cathedral of Learning\, University of Pittsburgh\, Pittsburgh\, United States\, 15260
DESCRIPTION:<p>Abstract:&nbsp\; Much of cognitive neuroscience construes cognitive capacities as involving representation in some way. Computational theories of vision\, for example\, typically posit structures that represent edges in the world. Neurons are often said to represent elements of their receptive fields. Despite the widespread use of representational talk in computational theorizing there is surprisingly little consensus about how such claims are to be understood. Is representational talk to be taken literally? Is it just a useful fiction? In this talk I sketch an account of the nature and function of representation in computational cognitive models that rejects both of these views. I call it a <em>deflationary</em> account.</p>
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