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PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260605T101409Z
DTSTART;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20121109T110000
DTEND;TZID=Australia/Melbourne:20121109T130000
SUMMARY:Staying Regular?
UID:20260608T003924Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Australia/Melbourne
LOCATION:Moot Court (G10)\, Ground Floor\, Old Quad\, University of Melbourne\, Parkville\, Melbourne\, Australia
DESCRIPTION:<p>&lsquo\;Regularity&rsquo\; conditions provide nice bridges between the various &lsquo\;box&rsquo\;/&lsquo\;diamond&rsquo\; modalities and various notions of probability. Schematically\, they have the form:</p>\n<p>&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; If X is possible\, then the probability of X is positive</p>\n<p>(or equivalents). Of special interest are the conditions we get when &lsquo\;possible&rsquo\; is understood doxastically (i.e. in terms of binary belief)\, and &lsquo\;probability&rsquo\; is understood subjectively (i.e. in terms of degrees of belief). I characterize these senses of &lsquo\;regularity&rsquo\;&mdash\;one for each agent&mdash\;in terms of a certain internal harmony of the agent&rsquo\;s probability space W\, F\, P>. I distinguish <em>three grades of probabilistic involvement</em>. A set of possibilities may be recognized by such a probability space by being a subset of W\; by being an element of F\; and by receiving positive probability from P. These are non-decreasingly committal ways in which the agent may countenance a proposition. An agent&rsquo\;s space is regular if these three grades collapse into one.</p>\n\n<p>I briefly review several of the main arguments for regularity as a rationality norm\, due especially to Lewis and Skyrms. There are two ways an agent could violate this norm: by assigning probability zero to some doxastic possibility\, and by not assigning probability at all to some doxastic possibility (a probability <em>gap</em>). Authors such as Williamson have argued for the rationality of the former kind of violation\, and I give an argument of my own. So I think that the second and third grades of probabilistic involvement may come apart for a rational agent. I then argue for the latter kind of violation: the first and second grades may also come apart for such an agent.</p>\n\n<p>Both kinds of violations of regularity have serious consequences for traditional Bayesian epistemology. I consider especially their ramifications for:</p>\n<p>-&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; conditional probability</p>\n<p>-&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; conditionalization </p>\n<p>-&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; probabilistic independence</p>\n<p>-&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\;&nbsp\; decision theory&nbsp\;</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Che-Ping Su:
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