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PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260423T185625Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/Sao_Paulo:20191210T043000
DTEND;TZID=America/Sao_Paulo:20191210T050000
SUMMARY:A map of the research on IiFS
UID:20260430T090220Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-6b96c54f56-bljdq
TZID:America/Sao_Paulo
LOCATION:Institute of Philosophy of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro\, Rio de Janeiro\, Brazil
DESCRIPTION:<p>Studies on inconsistency in factual science can be divided according to a classification of inconsistencies advanced by [3]\, [1\, pp.95&ndash\;96] and [4\, p.144].</p>\n<p><strong>Factual:</strong> Inconsistencies between a theory and data or observation\; i.e. &ldquo\;mean beliefs\, opinions\, theories that are held to be true even though there are facts which contradict them&rdquo\; [3\, p.488].</p>\n<p><strong>External:</strong> Inconsistencies between theories that describe the same system and that &ldquo\;attribute different natures to the same thing or arrive at different conclusions about it&rdquo\; [3\, p.484].</p>\n<p><strong>Internal:</strong> That characterize those theories that imply contradictory statements.</p>\n<p>Traditional epistemologists have always regarded any of these types of inconsistency as problematic\, which made them hold the following theses:</p>\n<p>&bull\; If a theory is inconsistency with data\, the it&rsquo\;s false.</p>\n<p>&bull\; If two theories contradict each other\, at least one of them is false.</p>\n<p>&bull\; An internally inconsistent theory is trivial and\, hence\, useless.</p>\n<p>Davey [2] calls counter-tradition to the programme &ndash\; often associated to paraconsistent logic &ndash\; that dispute these theses. In this lecture I present a review of the most important studies on inconsistency in factual science by traditional and counter-traditional epistemologists. The lecture will be divided in three sections corresponding (mainly) to the previous classification of inconsistencies.</p>\n<p><strong>Bibliography</strong></p>\n<p>[1] T. Bartelborth\, &ldquo\;Kann es rational sein\, eine inkonsistente Theorie zu akzeptieren?&rdquo\;\, Philosophia Naturalis\, 26 (1989)\, pp.91&ndash\;120.</p>\n<p>[2] K. Davey\, &ldquo\;Can good science be logically inconsistent?&rdquo\;\, Synthese\, 191(13) (2014)\, pp.3009&ndash\;3026.</p>\n<p>[3] R. Gotesky\, &ldquo\;The uses of Inconsistency&rdquo\;\, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research\, 28(4) (1968)\, pp.471&ndash\;500.</p>\n<p>[4] G. Priest\, Doubt Truth to be a Liar\, Clarendon Press\, 2006.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Luis Felipe Bartolo Alegre:
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