Part of the value of many scientific models depends upon their representational inadequacy. \;Idealization\, approximation\, and simplification are merits rather than defects of such models. \;Pragmatists and instrumentalists have argued extensively that this does not matter\, as long as \;these models serve their descriptive or predictive purposes. However\, such models seem to play a \;vital role in understanding and explaining reality and in giving us descriptions of what there is\; \;prima facie\, their function does not reduce to merely enabling us to somehow get along. As long as \;notions of understanding\, explanation\, ontology and knowledge are interpreted in non-pragmatist \;or non-instrumentalist terms\, it is not at all clear how idealized models may help us understand \;the world\, or how they can possibly exhibit something like explanatory power. In this workshop\, we \;will address the representational nature of inadequate models on one hand\, and the relation \;between the epistemic and explanatory nature of such models (and similar forms of \;representation) on the other. \;
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Contact: vanriel@gmx [dot] de.