BEGIN:VCALENDAR PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN VERSION:2.0 CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20240328T183958Z DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Zurich:20210706T050000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/Zurich:20210709T170000 SUMMARY:The Ethics of Emotions: Fittingness\, Fairness\, and Control UID:20240328T183958Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-6f97df9687-7c6q9 TZID:Europe/Zurich LOCATION:Schanzeneckstrasse 1\, Bern\, Switzerland\, 3012 DESCRIPTION:
Emotions have become a focus of attention in various areas of moral philosophy: the fairness of attitudes like anger and resentment plays an important role in many Strawsonian accounts of moral responsibility\; it is considered appropriate or even virtuous to admire the good and despise the bad\; the harms that fear and contempt can do to individuals and their relationships are highlighted. In these and other contexts\, emotions are subjected to what appear to be various forms of moral critique. They are considered hurtful\, inappropriate\, or unfair\, e.g. when someone resents a more successful colleague\, is amused at a racist joke\, disgusted by a someone&rsquo\;s bodily deformation\, or angry at a small child. But are these valid forms of criticising our emotions? Can emotions be a proper object of moral evaluation? Can we hold people responsible for them?
\nEmotions have long been considered an appropriate target for certain kinds of epistemic criticism\, e.g. in terms of representational accuracy or their coherence with one&rsquo\;s beliefs about their object. For example\, the fear of a harmless spider is considered unfitting because it misrepresents the spider as dangerous. However\, assessing an emotion as inappropriate or unfair seems more severe than saying that it is somehow mistaken about its object. On the other hand\, many consider emotions to be the wrong kind of object for moral critique. After all\, we don&rsquo\;t have voluntary control over our emotions (as we have over our actions)\, so how can it be morally wrong or even blameworthy to feel them?
\nThe aim of the conference is to investigate the norms that govern our emotions and to explore whether there can be an ethics of emotions. In particular\, it will provide an occasion for discussing fundamental questions at the intersection of normative ethics\, the theory of responsibility\, and the philosophy of emotions\, including\, but not limited to\, the following:
\nThe conference will feature talks by:
\n \;Macalester Bell (Bryn Mawr College)
 \;Jonas Blatter (University of Bern)
 \;Justin D'Arms (Ohio State University)
 \;Sabine Dö\;ring (University of Tü\;bingen)
 \;Leonhard Menges (University of Salzburg)
 \;Anne Meylan (University of Zurich)
 \;Jonathan Mitchell (University of Manchester)
 \;Sebastian Schmidt (University of Zurich)
 \;Laura Silva (University of Geneva)
 \;Christine Tappolet &\; Mauro Rossi (University of Montré\;al)
 \;Fabrice Teroni &\; Julien Deonna (University of Geneva)
 \;Vida Yao (Rice University)