BEGIN:VCALENDAR PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN VERSION:2.0 CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20240329T123319Z DTSTART;TZID=America/Toronto:20210131T180000 DTEND;TZID=America/Toronto:20210131T180000 SUMMARY:Synthese Topical Collection: Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic UID:20240329T123319Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-6f97df9687-7c6q9 TZID:America/Toronto DESCRIPTION:
*EXTENDED DEADLINE* 31st January 2021
\nGuest Editors:
\nFilippo Ferrari (University of Padua)\, Ben Martin (University of Bergen)\, Maria Paola Sforza Fogliani (School for Advanced Studies IUSS Pavia)
\nTopical \;Collection Description:
\nThe historical consensus seems to be that logic is somehow special. \;Whereas empirical evidence is used to support theories within both the natural and social sciences\, logic answers solely to \;a priori \;evidence. Further\, unlike other areas of research that rely upon a \;priori evidence\, such as mathematics\, logical evidence \;is basic. While we can assume the validity of certain inferences in order to establish truths within mathematics and test scientific theories\, logicians cannot use results from mathematics or the empirical sciences without seemingly begging the question. Further\, unlike theories in other domains\, which are about particular objects (however general these theories are)\, logical theories lack such content\, and thus are wholly formal. Additionally\, unlike scientific theories\, which describe how the world is\, logical theories do not merely describe some state of affairs\, such as how we do \;reason\, but provide a normative theory\, about how we \;ought \;to reason. Anti-exceptionalism about logic (AEL) is the denial of at least one of these traditionally exceptional properties of logic: that it is purely formal\, has normative force\, and that logical evidence is both foundational and \;a priori.
\nOur hope is that this Topical Collection advances the area of \;research\, concentrating particularly on four important themes:
\nProperties of Logic.
\nAEL proposes that logic fails to possess a series of properties that have traditionally been taken to make logic special\, such as its laws being formal and general\, logical evidence being \;a priori \;and foundational\, and its theories having normative force regarding how we ought to reason. This articulation of the position itself raises important questions: i) What is the relationship between these properties in the context of AEL? ii) Is it really the case that these properties have prominently been assigned to logic and &ndash\; if so &ndash\; how should we understand them\, exactly? iii) Does one&rsquo\;s commitment to AEL commit one to other important positions within the philosophy of logic (e.g. logical pluralism)?
\nLogical Methodology.
\nOne of the prominent claims by AEL is that the methodology of logic is similar to the methodology of the sciences. Such an account is often explained in terms of abductive criteria\, where logical theories are evaluated on their basis to accommodate some relevant \;data\, and possess certain theoretical virtues. However: i) What data is there for logical theories to accommodate? ii) What theoretical virtues are logical theories to possess? iii) Are scientific theories chosen by such abductive criteria\, as AEL proposes?
\nMetaphysics of Logic.
\nAnother important claim made by AEL is that the subject matter of logic is similar\, in some crucial respects\, to that of the sciences. How should we understand this claim? For example\, is there a particular subject matter in the sciences such as that logic \;could share in this matter? Further\, by proposing that logic has a subject matter similar to the sciences\, is AEL committed to taking on an ontology of logic?
\nObjections.
\nWhile a significant number of papers have now been written outlining AEL in different forms\, little has been written on the challenges facing the position. What are the significant problems facing different versions of AEL in their rejection of these putative \;&lsquo\;exceptional&rsquo\; properties of logic?
\nInstructions for submission:
\nIn order to submit your paper to the topical collection\, please log in to the Synthese Editorial Manager following this link: \;
\nhttps://www.editorialmanager.com/synt/default.aspx. \;
\nOnce you are logged in\, you'll be asked to specify the article \; \;type. Please select the following option: T.C.: Anti-Exceptionalism about logic (you'll find it near the end of the list). All the other steps should be standard procedure. \;
\nThe deadline for submission is
\n31st January 2021
\nFor further information\, please contact the \;guest editors using the following email address: logicalantiexceptionalism@gmail.com \;
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