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VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260604T230430Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20201009T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Berlin:20201009T120000
SUMMARY:Immunity to error through misidentification in observer memories: a moderate separatist account
UID:20260606T192955Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Europe/Berlin
LOCATION:Bochum\, Germany
DESCRIPTION:<p>Abstract: Judgments based on episodic memory are often thought to be immune to errors of misidentification (IEM). Yet there is a certain category of episodic memories that seems to threaten this supposed immunity of our memory-based judgments. Are observer memories a threat to the (potential) IEM feature of memory-based judgments? In recent years the phenomenon of observer memories has raised a growing amount of interest amongst philosophers\, in particular due to its potential implication for the issue of IEM. In the resulting ongoing debate\, some say that observer memories are a threat to the IEM enjoyed by episodic memory (Michaelian\, 2020)\; others say that such memories pose no such threat (Fern&aacute\;ndez\, 2018\; Lin\, 2020). In this paper\, we argue for a middle way. First\, we frame the debate\, claiming that the existing literature lacks a satisfying definition both of observer memories and of the precise issue of errors of identification in such memories. Then\, we contribute to the debate by challenging an anti-separatist assumption about the relation between phenomenal and intentional features of observer memories that looms behind this debate. On this assumption\, if the rememberer&rsquo\;s self is built into the phenomenal content\, by implication it is also built into the intentional content. We reject this assumption and offer a moderate separatist account of the relation between phenomenal and intentional content. Then\, distinguishing between different species of observer memories by drawing upon the empirical literature\, we say that for one species the rememberer&rsquo\;s self is part of the phenomenal content but not built into the intentional content: such observer memories are not a threat to IEM. In contrast\, for another species of observer memories\, the rememberer&rsquo\;s self is both part of the phenomenal content and intentional content. This species of observer memory poses a threat to IEM in a qualified way. In particular\, whether this species of observer memory is a threat to IEM or not depends on the type of information that is used to construct the representation of the self in such images.</p>\n<p><strong>Zoom meeting room details:</strong></p>\n\n<p><strong>Link: </strong><a target="_blank">https://ruhr-uni-bochum.zoom.us/j/97457942133?pwd=SGVEdTZmY0UxZGEvVlkzZlYyZnpxUT09</a></p>\n\n<p><strong>Meeting ID:&nbsp\;</strong>974 5794 2133</p>\n\n<p><strong>Passcode:&nbsp\;</strong>&nbsp\;374170</p>\n<p>More info: https://for2812.rub.de/events/#event_18<br></p>\n
ORGANIZER;CN=Nikola Andonovski;CN=Kourken Michaelian;CN=Anco Peeters;CN=Markus Werning:
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