Stephen Darwall&rsquo\;s account of morality as a second-person standpoint theory is one of the most important contributions to moral philosophy in the last years. \;The account challenges a third-person interpretation of morality (with particular emphasis on Thomas Nagel&rsquo\;s theory) as well as a first-person standpoint theory of morality (especially Christine M. Korsgaard&rsquo\;s conception).
\nRecently Darwall has extended his second-person standpoint theory to legal philosophy arguing that the second-person standpoint helps us to formulate a more plausible account of legality\, legitimacy and legitimate authority. In particular\, Darwall&rsquo\;s criticism of Joseph Raz&rsquo\;s views on authority has become prominent in legal philosophy.
\nThe aim of the workshop is to present critical papers on Darwall&rsquo\;s moral philosophy and legal philosophy. Issues we will address include: legality\, legitimacy and legitimate authority\; practical reasoning and reasons\; Kantian internalism versus contractualism and consequentialism\; Scanlon&rsquo\;s and Darwall&rsquo\;s accounts of contractualism. Stephen Darwall will be present at this workshop and reply to the papers.
\nWe would gladly welcome you to attend this workshop. If you have any further inquiry\, do not hesitate to get in touch with us (using the following e-mails: \;andrea.perchthaler@univie.ac.at\, \;christoph.hanisch@univie.ac.at\, \;alexandra.couto@univie.ac.at).
\nERC-Project &ldquo\;Distortions of Normativity&rdquo\;\, Department of Philosophy\, University of Vienna
ORGANIZER;CN=Herlinde Pauer-Studer;CN=Alexandra Couto;CN=Christoph Hanisch: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR