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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260617T194703Z
DTSTART;TZID=Africa/Abidjan:20201020T100000
DTEND;TZID=Africa/Abidjan:20201020T130000
SUMMARY:Understanding & Scientific Progress
UID:20260622T163611Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Africa/Abidjan
LOCATION:Reykjavík\, Iceland
DESCRIPTION:<p>This is the fourth event in a series of online workshops affiliated with the international research project "Understanding Progress\, in Science and Beyond"\, which is hosted at the University of Iceland.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>The theme of this fourth workshop is understanding and its relation to scientific progress. The workshop will consist of two talks. The event is open to all who are interested in listening in and/or participating in the Q&amp\;A. The schedule is as follows:&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>13:30 GMT - Zoom link opens.</p>\n<p>14:00 GMT -&nbsp\;<strong>Michael Stuart (Geneva):&nbsp\;</strong>On Pragmatic Understanding: Its Nature and Relation to Explanatory and Objectual Understanding.</p>\n<em>This talk has three goals. First\, I&rsquo\;ll argue that the popular distinction between explanatory\, objectual and pragmatic understanding should be understood as a distinction between&nbsp\;states&nbsp\;of understanding\, rather than having to do with&nbsp\;modes&nbsp\;or&nbsp\;objects&nbsp\;of understanding. Second\, I&rsquo\;ll try to address the question of fundamentality. What do we mean when we say that one of these kinds of understanding is more fundamental than the others? Third\, because pragmatic understanding is the least discussed of the three main kinds of understanding\, I&rsquo\;ll sketch a preliminary account of it\, drawing what lessons I can from the existing literature.</em>\n&nbsp\;\n<p>14:35 GMT -&nbsp\;<strong>Angela Potochnik (Cincinnati):&nbsp\;</strong>A Non-Factive Epistemic Standard for Understanding and its Implications for Scientific Progress.</p>\n<p><em>Factivism or veritism about scientific understanding is the idea that truth is a requirement for legitimate understanding. One motivation for this idea is that there must be an objective standard for legitimate understanding in order for this to qualify as an epistemic success. I reject factivism about understanding: S can understand that A because B when B is not true. In this talk\, I motivate an alternative standard for legitimate understanding that appeals to a broadened notion of epistemic acceptability rather than truth. I then argue that this revised standard for legitimate understanding better accommodates the nature of our present day scientific understanding as well as providing a natural interpretation of the idea that there is cumulative scientific progress.&nbsp\;</em></p>\n<p><em></em>15:35 GMT - Event ends.</p>\n<p><strong><br></strong></p>\n<p><strong>****</strong></p>\n<p><strong><br></strong></p>\n<p><strong>Zoom details</strong></p>\n<p>Time: October 20th\, 2020\, Reykjav&iacute\;k\, 13:30 GMT</p>\n<p>Join Zoom Meeting:&nbsp\;https://eu01web.zoom.us/j/9709748349</p>\n<p>Meeting ID:&nbsp\;970 974 8349</p>
ORGANIZER;CN="Finnur Dellsén";CN=Insa Lawler;CN="Victor Karl Magnússon";CN=James Norton:
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