BEGIN:VCALENDAR PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN VERSION:2.0 CALSCALE:GREGORIAN METHOD:PUBLISH BEGIN:VEVENT DTSTAMP:20260605T121654Z DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Taipei:20130112T090000 DTEND;TZID=Asia/Taipei:20130112T170000 SUMMARY:Consciousness and the Self UID:20260608T091341Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm TZID:Asia/Taipei LOCATION:Taipei\, Taiwan DESCRIPTION:

Keynote Speaker: Prof. Albert Newen (Institute of Philosophy II\, Ruhr \;University Bochum\, Germany)
Title: Self-Consciousness and Agency

Abstract: The structure of the acting self is still perplexing and remains an often confounded issue in the recent debates. This talk provides a new \;systematic theory of self-consciousness in general and of two of its main \;features\, the sense of agency and the sense of ownership. Furthermore\, the \;phenomenon of responsibility can be separated from both phenomena. The \;theoretical framework will be shown to be fruitful in the context of the \;recent experiments in neuroscience including own studies. An important \;background of the new approach is a theory of levels of mental \;representation. It will be argued that we have to distinguish at least \;nonconceptual representations\, conceptual representations and meta-representations. On the basis of clearly defined levels of representation \;it will be argued that one has to differentiate (i) an individual-orientated cognitive dimension of agency and ownership from (ii) a socio-normative dimension of responsibility. Gallagher introduced the \;distinction between agency and ownership. We need this distinction to \;account for passive movement of my arm since I still have the feeling of \;ownership in such a case but no feeling of agency. Furthermore\, it is \;shown that we have to distinguish the feeling of agency and the judgment \;of agency. I can develop a feeling of agency in everyday automatic doings \;without explicitly judging that I am the agent. The feeling of agency is \;realized by nonconceptual representations. I may also develop a judgment \;of agency without any feeling of agency: The judgment of agency is \;realized by conceptual representations. Furthermore\, it is shown that \;responsibility is a separate dimension from both aspects. I can judge that \;I am the agent of an action but deny responsibility by arguing that I just \;followed a strict order. This indicates that the ascription of \;responsibility presupposes a theory of social interaction. Responsibility \;is relying on meta-representations which are typically involved in the so-called theory-of-mind ability. Analogous distinctions have to be made \;concerning the phenomenon of ownership. The proposed theory of  \;self-consciousness is shown to be very fruitful from the perspectives of \;psychology\, psychiatry and neuroscience.

Information &\; Registration: \;ccling1989@gmail.com.

ORGANIZER: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR