MONTHLY PHENOMENOLOGY
An online forum of discussion on recent work in phenomenology
Description: This series of talks will gather together scholars interested in phenomenology and its relation to contemporary issues in philosophy\, especially in the philosophy of mind. It aims at establishing a forum of discussion where people can meet on a regular basis and present their work-in-progress or recent publications. The topics addressed will stretch from the history of early phenomenology to the systematic application of phenomenological insights to recent debates in analytic philosophy. \; \;
\nSchedule: The talks will take place once a month on a Friday for 8 months (with a break in March). Time: 10:15am EST/EDT\, 3:15pm GMT\, 4:15pm CET. Talks last 90 minutes\, including a 45 minutes Q&\;A. \;
\nParticipation: Talks are held on \;zoom. To participate\, please send an email to \;hamid.taieb@hu-berlin.de \;with the heading: "Registration Monthly Phenomenology". A zoom link will be sent to you the day preceding each talk. \;
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Programme:
**Next talk** \;
Matt Bower (Texas State University)
Against Inadequacy
Friday\, 9 July 2021
10:15am EDT\, 3:15pm GMT\, 4:15pm CET \;
Abstract: One of Husserl&rsquo\;s signature ideas is that perceptual experience is structured into fulfilled and empty components. To illustrate\, consider that when visually inspecting a cup only some of its exterior and interior fall into your line of sight and to that extent are experienced in fulfillment. However\, you are perceptually sensitive to the fact that the cup&rsquo\;s exterior and interior exceed what falls into your line of sight. The contents of that sort of awareness are experienced emptily\, without fulfillment. Or so Husserl would characterize the experience. His view that perceptual experience is structured into fulfilled and empty components is the immediate consequence of his thesis that perceptual experience is inherently inadequate. That means\, roughly\, that a perceptual experience never presents things to us exactly as the experience itself takes them to be. There is always \;more \;to how things are perceptually taken to be than how they are given. Here I explicate the conceptual pair adequacy/inadequacy\, locate it in Husserl&rsquo\;s larger philosophical vision\, sketch his rationale for thinking perceptual experience is inherently inadequate\, and then question this last thought by raising criticisms concerning both its rationale and the consequences it entails. I hope to show that Husserl&rsquo\;s conception of perceptual experience as inherently inadequate is untenable.
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**Past talks** \;
Samantha Matherne (Harvard University)
The Normativity of Color: Perspectives from Edith Landmann-Kalischer and Maurice Merleau-Ponty
20 November 2020 \;
Chiara Russo Krauss (University of Naples Federico II)
Was Mach a Phenomenalist? And How His Pupil Petzoldt Can Help Us Answer This Question
11 December 2020 \;
Carlota Serrahima (University of Antwerp)
Sensory Fields: The Visual and the Bodily
29 January 2021 \;
Chad Kidd (City University of New York)
Sensory and Cognitive Presence to Mind
26 February 2021 (postponed to 12 March 2021) \;
Marta Jorba (University Pompeu Fabra)
Possibilities for Action in Thought
9 April 2021 \;
Anna Giustina (University of Liè\;ge)
An Acquaintance Alternative to Self-Representationalism
7 May 2021
Joel Smith (University of Manchester) \;
The Possibility of Communication: Perceptual Demonstratives in the \;Logical Investigations
25 June 2021
Organized on behalf of the \;Network for Phenomenological Research