BEGIN:VCALENDAR
PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260605T175855Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210118T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210118T120000
SUMMARY:'Normative Powers and Social Practices'
UID:20260609T131813Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Europe/London
LOCATION:Oxford\, United Kingdom
DESCRIPTION:<p>ABSTRACT. Normative powers have been the subject of complex debates in philosophy. There are rich literatures on\, e.g.\, consent\, authority\, promising\, and forgiveness\, to name a few. Yet\, there is relatively little discussion of normative powers as such\, as a general category. My aim in this paper is to fill this gap. Specifically\, the paper&rsquo\;s intended contribution is twofold: conceptual (concerning the definition of such powers) and ontological (concerning the existence conditions of such powers). On the conceptual side\, I offer a general definition of normative powers&mdash\;be they legal\, conventional\, or moral&mdash\;one that I believe better captures the relevant phenomenon than alternative definitions found in the literature. On the ontological side\, I argue that normative powers\, including moral powers\, cannot exist in the absence of social practices. Social practices conferring them on individuals are necessary existence conditions of those powers.</p>
ORGANIZER:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR