Dr Nevin Climenhaga (ACU)
\n&ldquo\;A Cumulative Case Argument for Infallibilism.&rdquo\;
\n\;I present a cumulative case for an infallibilist theory of knowledge\, according to which we know all and only those propositions that are certain for us. I argue that this theory can easily explain the truth of eight plausible claims about knowledge:
\n(1) \; \; There is a qualitative difference between knowledge and non-knowledge.
\n(2) \; \; Knowledge is valuable in a way that non-knowledge is not.
\n(3) \; \; Subjects in Gettier cases do not have knowledge.
\n(4) \; \; If S knows that P\, P is part of S&rsquo\;s evidence.
\n(5) \; \; If S knows that P\, ~P is epistemically impossible for S.
\n(6) \; \; If S knows that P\, S can rationally act as if P.
\n(7) \; \; If S knows that P\, S can rationally stop inquiring whether P.
\n(8) \; \; If S knows each of {P1\, P2\, &hellip\; Pn}\, and competently deduces Q from these propositions\, S knows that Q.
\nI then argue that the skeptical costs of this theory are outweighed by its explanatory power.
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\n ORGANIZER;CN=George Duke: METHOD:PUBLISH END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR