PLENARY SPEAKERS
\nSimon Blackburn
A.C. Grayling
Peter Hacker
Iain McGilchrist
David Papineau
Sally Satel
Roger Scruton
Raymond Tallis
BACKGROUND
\nIt is now over 20 years since Churchland&rsquo\;s book\nNeurophilosophy was published\, and in its wake whole disciplines \nhave sprung into being\, proudly sporting the prefix &lsquo\;neuro-&rsquo\; by way of \nattaching themselves to Churchland&rsquo\;s banner. We have entered a new \nperiod in which philosophy\, among a substantial\n community of its practitioners\, might be seen as the handmaiden of \nneuroscience\, whose role is to remove the obstacles that have been laid \nin the path of scientific advance by popular prejudice and superstitious\n ways of thinking. Brain imaging techniques\,\n which enable us to allocate mental functions to precise cortical areas\,\n and in some cases to establish the neural pathways through which \ninformation is processed and decisions formed\, have cast doubt on the \nreality of human freedom\, have revised the description\n of reason and its place in human nature\, and caused many people to \nsuspect the validity of the old distinctions of kind\, which separated \nperson from animal\, animal from machine and the free agent from the \nconditioned organism. In addition\, the more we learn\n about the brain and its functions\, the more do people wonder whether \nour old ways of managing our lives and resolving our conflicts &ndash\; the \nways of moral judgment\, legal process and the imparting of virtue &ndash\; are \nthe best ways\, and whether there might be more\n direct forms of intervention that would take us more speedily\, more \nreliably and perhaps more kindly to the right result.
\nThese\n developments appear to sit uneasily with the traditional concept of the\n person\, a central concern of philosophy since at least the early Middle\n Ages. From\n infancy each of us singles out persons from the rest of our environment\n as recipients of love\, affection\, anger and forgiveness. We face them \neye-to-eye and I- to-Thou\, believing each person to be a centre of \nself-conscious reflection who responds to reasons\,\n who makes decisions\, and whose life forms a continuous narrative in \nwhich individual identity is maintained from moment to moment and from \nyear to year. Are we then justified in treating the traditional \nattributes of persons\, such as self-identity\, thought\,\n free will and consciousness\, simply as &ldquo\;folk psychological&rdquo\; concepts to\n be revised in a physically reductionistic manner\, or can developments \nin neuroscience be interpreted within alternative philosophical \nframeworks? Furthermore\, what are the broader implications\n for new first\, second and third-personal understanding in moral \njudgment\, in the law\, in religion\, politics and the arts?
\nThe\n purpose of this conference is to discuss and debate these developments \nfrom a variety of perspectives\, to examine the relevance of neuroscience\n both to philosophy\n and to the other humanities of the post-Enlightenment university\, and \nto confront the intellectual issues that surround the emergence of what \nmight reasonably be called a &lsquo\;neuroculture&rsquo\;.
\nREGISTRATION
\nAll those wishing to attend the conference are invited to register via:
\nOxford University online shop
http://www.oxforduniversitystores.co.uk/browse/product.asp?compid=1&\;modid=1&\;catid=1256
The registration fee includes simple lunch\, tea and coffee for each day.
\nACCOMMODATION AND MEALS
\nThere are two options:
\n(1)\n Book a room at St Anne&rsquo\;s College\, Oxford\, arriving Wed 11 July\, \ndeparting Sunday 15 July in the morning. This option includes the cost \nof all the dinners during\n the conference.
http://www.oxforduniversitystores.co.uk/browse/product.asp?compid=1&\;modid=1&\;catid=1254
(2) Purchase individual dinners only\, without accommodation.
http://www.oxforduniversitystores.co.uk/browse/product.asp?compid=1&\;modid=1&\;catid=1255