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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260604T060142Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20210907T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20210910T170000
SUMMARY:ManCEPT 2021 - State of the Art: The Nature and Function of Rights
UID:20260604T130206Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-bd7db559-gt5qm
TZID:Europe/London
LOCATION:Manchester\, United Kingdom
DESCRIPTION:<p><strong>Convenors</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Giulio Fornaroli&nbsp\;</strong>(Universidad Nacional Aut&oacute\;noma de M&eacute\;xico)</p>\n<p><strong>Cristi&aacute\;n Rettig&nbsp\;</strong>(Universidad Adolfo Ib&aacute\;&ntilde\;ez)</p>\n<p><strong>Up to Date Confirmed Keynote Speakers</strong></p>\n<p><strong>Renee Bolinger&nbsp\;</strong>(Princeton)\;<strong>&nbsp\;Nicolas Cornell&nbsp\;&nbsp\;</strong>(Michigan &ndash\; Ann Arbor)\;<strong>&nbsp\;Rowan Cruft&nbsp\;</strong>(Stirling)\;<strong>&nbsp\;Matthew Kramer&nbsp\;</strong>(Cambridge)\;<strong>&nbsp\;Saladin&nbsp\; Meckled-Garica&nbsp\;</strong>(UCL)\;<strong>&nbsp\;Laura Valentini&nbsp\;</strong>(LMU)<strong>&nbsp\;<br></strong></p>\n\n<p>The philosophy of rights in the last decades has been both prolific and deeply innovative. The&nbsp\; will vs. interest debate still informs\, in an always more sophisticated form\, a good part of the&nbsp\; scholarship. But recent accounts by authors such as Cruft\, Gilbert\, Sreenivasan and Wenar at tempt to overcome or radically reframe the debate.&nbsp\;&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>In the meantime\, growing attention is being devoted to the concept of a directed duty. It&nbsp\; is now commonly accepted that the duties correlating with claim-rights are characterized by an&nbsp\; element of&nbsp\;<em>direction&nbsp\;</em>(they are to be discharged&nbsp\;<em>for&nbsp\;</em>the right-holder\; they are owed&nbsp\;<em>to&nbsp\;</em>them)&nbsp\; absent in generic ethical duties.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Directionality is increasingly taken as a crucial feature in the understanding of the&nbsp\;<em>nature&nbsp\;&nbsp\;</em>of claim-rights. But what directed duties are is far from clear. Some understand directed duties as creating their own separate realm of bipolar or second-personal normativity that is irreduc ible to the third-personal normativity of general ethical norms. Ohers\, however\, (Darwall\, Wal lace) argue that ethics in general is\, at bottom\, a second-personal exercise.&nbsp\;&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Equally ripe for debate is the relationship between directionality and interest or will&nbsp\; theories. Is directionality a challenge for traditional will- and interest-accounts of the function&nbsp\; of rights? Or is it\, by contrast\, an element of claim-rights that will and interest theories are per fectly fit to capture and explain (as argued by both Steiner and Kramer)?&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>And\, how do these theoretical puzzles in the general philosophy of rights relate to ap plied questions about rights in legal theory? If directionality is indeed the core property of&nbsp\; rights\, what should we think of those rights that do not seem to involve bipolar normativity?&nbsp\; Consider rights&nbsp\;<em>in rem&nbsp\;</em>such as those found in property or criminal law\, which are directed&nbsp\;against a collection of duty-bearers\, consisting in the whole world. How should directionality&nbsp\; be understood here?&nbsp\;&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>A different question that has lately attracted renewed interest concerns&nbsp\;<em>natural&nbsp\;</em>rights.&nbsp\; What role\, if any\, should they play in a general theory of rights? And\, if we do not want to ex press outright skepticism about their function\, what can we say about their&nbsp\;<em>grounds</em>?&nbsp\;&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Finally\, is there anything about the concept of a right that determines which entities can&nbsp\; be holders of rights? Interest and will theorists have traditionally answered differently to this&nbsp\; question\, and it is far from obvious how authors who take inspiration from directionality can&nbsp\; use that paradigm to tell us whether non-human animals\, or group agents\, or the future generations and the dead\, or maybe even natural elements and human artefacts can hold rights.&nbsp\; The workshop welcomes any contribution which aims at answering&nbsp\;<strong><em>these and related&nbsp\; questions&nbsp\;</em></strong>about the nature and function of rights.&nbsp\;&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>To apply\, please send a&nbsp\;<strong>300-400-word abstract&nbsp\;</strong>to&nbsp\;rightsmancept2021@gmail.com&nbsp\;</a><strong>by 15</strong><strong>th</strong>&nbsp\;<strong>May</strong>. We aspire to give around 40 minutes (inclusive of both presentation and Q&amp\;A) per paper.&nbsp\;&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Registration will open in May. All participants must register in order to attend.</p>\n<p>This year&rsquo\;s fees are&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Academics: &pound\;45&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Graduate students\, retirees\, and unaffiliated attendees: &pound\;20&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Non-speaker/non-presenting attendees: &pound\;15&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>A small number of bursaries (for graduate students only) are available. Please state in your&nbsp\; application to our panel whether you intend to apply for a bursary.&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>We look forward to reading your abstracts\,&nbsp\;</p>\n<p>Giulio and Cristi&aacute\;n.&nbsp\;</p>
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