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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260420T024802Z
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Zurich:20210606T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Zurich:20210606T170000
SUMMARY:Identity in Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science
UID:20260423T111305Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-nv7xt
TZID:Europe/Zurich
LOCATION:Lugano\, Switzerland
DESCRIPTION:<p>Workshop: Identity in Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science<br><br>Sunday 6th June\, online via videoconference <br>ALL TIMES ARE CENTRAL EUROPEAN TIME (CET).<br><br>***<br> 9.00 Kathrin Koslicki (University of Neuch&acirc\;tel): Artifacts and the Limits of Human Creative Intentions</p>\n<p>10.15 James Ladyman (Bristol University): Identity\, Intension and Isomorphism</p>\n<p>11.30 Kai Wehmeier (University of California): Relational Identity: Lessons from Frege and Wittgenstein</p>\n<p>12.30 Lunch break</p>\n<p>14.00 Fabrice Correia (University of Geneva): Factual Identity vs Propositional Identity</p>\n<p>15.15 Charlotte Werndl (University of Salzburg) Can Somebody Please Say What Gibbsian Statistical Mechanics Says?</p>\n<p>16.30 Augustin Rayo (MIT)Transcendence and Triviality</p>\n<p>***</p>\n<p>Abstracts: <br> <br>Kai Wehmeier (University of California): Relational Identity: Lessons from Frege and Wittgenstein <br> <br>After a brief review of several notions in the vicinity of identity\, I will present a reconstruction of what I take to be the principal historical argument against the properly relational character of objectual identity and discuss several objections to it. I will then present Frege&rsquo\;s Begriffsschrift theory of identity\, according to which identity is a relation between names\, as a viable option\, and sharpen it in the light of an objection based on the necessity of identity. <br> <br> <br>Fabrice Correia (University of Geneva): Factual Identity vs Propositional Identity <br> <br>I will defend the logic of factual identity (aka factual equivalence) that I advocated in &ldquo\;On the Logic of Factual Equivalence&rdquo\; (Review of Symbolic Logic\, 2016) against what seems to be a powerful objection. The objection\, I will argue\, probably rests on the failure to distinguish between factual identity and what I will call &ldquo\;propositional identity&rdquo\;. <br> <br> <br>Augustin Rayo (MIT): Transcendence and Triviality <br> <br>Modal contingentists face a dilemma:&nbsp\; there are two attractive principles ofwhich they can only accept one.&nbsp\;&nbsp\; In this paper I show that the most naturalway of resolving the dilemma leads to expressive limitations. I then develop analternative resolution. In addition to overcoming the expressive limitations\, thealternative picture allows for an attractive account of arithmetic and for a styleof semantic theorizing that can be helpful to contingentists. <ahref="http://web.mit.edu/arayo/www/bcbc.pdf">http://web.mit.edu/arayo/www/bcbc.pdf</a> </p>\n<p><br>If you want to participate\, please register by sending an e-mail with "Identity workshop: registration" in the subject line to Robert Michels: robert.michels@usi.ch</p>\n<p><br> Organisers: Jonas Waechter and Robert Michels</p>\n<p>Funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation.<br>Identity in Cognitive Science\, Quantum Mechanics\, and Metaphysics<br>Project nr. 185435\, PI: Kevin Mulligan</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Robert Michels;CN=Jonas Waechter:
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