BEGIN:VCALENDAR
PRODID:-//Grails iCalendar plugin//NONSGML Grails iCalendar plugin//EN
VERSION:2.0
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
METHOD:PUBLISH
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260407T095000Z
DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Tehran:20210911T063000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Tehran:20210911T080000
SUMMARY:Some Evidence for Physicalism about Sensations
UID:20260408T061926Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-f5d4878dd-r5qzs
TZID:Asia/Tehran
LOCATION:Tehrān\, Iran
DESCRIPTION:<p>The event will be held at <strong>11 AM (Iran Daylight Time (GMT+4:30))</strong>.</p>\n<p>Please attend via the following link:</p>\n<p><u>http://www.irip.ac.ir/u/136</u></p>\n<p>and enter into the room as "Guest".</p>\n<p><strong>Abstract</strong>:</p>\n<p>I will address the hardest case for physicalism: perceptual and bodily sensations with distinctive phenomenal characters that we are aware of through introspection.&nbsp\; I will clarify that physicalism about sensations requires that sensations and their properties are one and the same as certain physical or functional state-types.&nbsp\; Then I will argue that some evidence for these type-identity claims exists: the fact\, discovered from numerous imaging studies\, that having a particular kind of sensation with a particular phenomenal character requires&mdash\;never in fact occurs without&mdash\;being in a particular brain state.&nbsp\; I will specify precisely how this fact supports physicalism over its dualist rivals.</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Hamed Bikaraan-Behesht:
METHOD:PUBLISH
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR