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ABSTRACT

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Among Matthew Kramer&rsquo\;s numerous contributions to the debate over the function and nature of rights\, Bentham&rsquo\;s Test (BT) occupies an important role. It is designed to figure out to whom an existing duty is owed. A given duty is owed to Z &ldquo\;if and only if a violation of a duty [...] can be established by simply showing that the duty-bearer has withheld a benefit from Z or has imposed some harm upon him.&rdquo\; (Kramer 1998\, p. 81) BT has been criticized\, perhaps most notably by Steiner (1998)\, Simmonds (1998)\, Frydrych (2017)\, and Sreenivasan (2005\; 2010\; 2017)\, for being unable to do the work it has been devised for\, viz.\, to overcome the Interest Theory&rsquo\;s problem of being too expansive\, especially when it comes to third-party beneficiaries.1 In response to his critics\, Kramer (2007\; 2010) has refined BT\,2 but\, even with these modifications\, some sort of deadlock obtains. Kramer doesn&rsquo\;t think BT leads to over-inclusivity\, his critics do (cf. Frydrych 2018\, p. 584\; Stewart2012\, p. 320.).

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To break this apparent tie my argument against Kramer takes a different route. I don&rsquo\;t attempt to prove that BT is over-inclusive\, but rather that it leads to a tension with &ldquo\;[t]hebasic idea underlying the Interest Theory [which] is that every right protects some aspect of a person&rsquo\;s welfare.&rdquo\; (Kramer 1998\, p. 61) Much of the Interest Theory&rsquo\;s initial plausibility stems from this basic intuition. Hence\, it would be a serious problem for Kramer should it turn out that BT comes into conflict with said intuition.

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The tension becomes apparent in certain cases of third-party beneficiaries: According to BT\, C holds a right in (at least some) cases in which A holds the power to waive B&rsquo\;s duty to '\, but C benefits from B&rsquo\;s doing '. Some aspect of C&rsquo\;s welfare is (seemingly) protected by that right. However\, since A holds the power to waive B&rsquo\;s duty\, it seems that the correlating right is entirely at the whim of A. But in what sense\, then\, does C&rsquo\;s right protect her interest? The right doesn&rsquo\;t seem to provide an additional layer of protection. If A doesn&rsquo\;t want C to have the benefit\, she will simply waive B&rsquo\;s duty. C&rsquo\;s interest is not protected\, but only aligned with an interest of A&rsquo\;s\, and as soon as those interests fall out of line with each other C&rsquo\;s interest will be set back. Therefore\, BT is at odds with the basic idea that rights protect interests.

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Notes

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1. This weakness of the Interest Theory was spotted early on by Hart (1955).

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2. Recently Kurki (2018) has attempted to improve even further on BT. I will show that the revised versions of BT suffer from the same problem.

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References

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Frydrych\, David (2017): &ldquo\;Kramer&rsquo\;s Delimiting Test for Legal Rights&rdquo\;. In: The American Journal

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of Jurisprudence 62.2\, pp. 197&ndash\;207.

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&ndash\; (2018): &ldquo\;The theories of rights debate&rdquo\;. In: Jurisprudence 9.3\, pp. 566&ndash\;588.

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Hart\, H. L. A. (1955): &ldquo\;Are There Any Natural Rights?&rdquo\; In: Philosophical Review 64.2\, pp. 175&ndash\;

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191.

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Kramer\, Matthew H. (1998): &ldquo\;Rights Without Trimmings&rdquo\;. In: A Debate Over Rights. Ed. by

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Matthew H. Kramer\; N.E. Simmonds\; Hillel Steiner. Oxford: Oxford University Press\,

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pp. 7&ndash\;112.

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&ndash\; (2010): &ldquo\;Refining the Interest Theory of Rights&rdquo\;. In: American Journal of Jurisprudence 55.1\,

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pp. 31&ndash\;39.

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Kramer\, Matthew H. and Hillel Steiner (2007): &ldquo\;Theories of Rights: Is There a Third Way?&rdquo\;

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In: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 27.2\, pp. 281&ndash\;310.

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Kurki\, Visa A. J. (2018): &ldquo\;Rights\, Harming and Wronging: A Restatement of the Interest

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Theory&rdquo\;. eng. In: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 38.3\, pp. 430&ndash\;450.

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Simmonds\, Nigel E. (1998): &ldquo\;Rights at the Cutting Edge&rdquo\;. In: A Debate Over Rights. Ed. by

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Matthew H. Kramer\; N.E. Simmonds\; Hillel Steiner. Oxford: Oxford University Press\,

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pp. 113&ndash\;232.

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Sreenivasan\, Gopal (2005): &ldquo\;A Hybrid Theory of Claim-Rights&rdquo\;. In: Oxford Journal of Legal

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Studies 25.2\, pp. 257&ndash\;274.

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&ndash\; (2010): &ldquo\;Duties and Their Direction&rdquo\;. In: Ethics 120.3\, pp. 465&ndash\;494.

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&ndash\; (2017): &ldquo\;Public Goods\, Individual Rights\, and Third Party Benefits&rdquo\;. In: New Essays on the

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Nature of Rights. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.

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Steiner\, Hillel (1998): &ldquo\;Working Rights&rdquo\;. In: A Debate Over Rights. Ed. by Matthew H. Kramer\;

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N.E. Simmonds\; Hillel Steiner. Oxford: Oxford University Press\, pp. 233&ndash\;301.

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Stewart\, Hamish (2012): &ldquo\;The Definition of a Right&rdquo\;. In: Jurisprudence 3.2\, pp. 319&ndash\;339.

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