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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTAMP:20260429T153748Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/Argentina/Buenos_Aires:20211117T110000
DTEND;TZID=America/Argentina/Buenos_Aires:20211117T130000
SUMMARY:The Second Person
UID:20260501T011005Z-iCalPlugin-Grails@philevents-web-6b96c54f56-bljdq
TZID:America/Argentina/Buenos_Aires
LOCATION:Buenos Aires\, Argentina
DESCRIPTION:<p>We are glad to announce that the next session of our internal seminar "Philosophy of Mind"&nbsp\;(Instituto de Investigaciones Filos&oacute\;ficas\, Argentina) will be open to the public and include special guests. &nbsp\;</p>\n<p><strong>THE SECOND PERSON</strong> (Wednesday the 17th November\, 11am Buenos Aires\, 3pm CET)</p>\n<p><strong>Diana P&eacute\;rez</strong> (Universidad de Buenos Aires / Instituto de Investigaciones Filos&oacute\;ficas - SADAF &amp\; CONICET\, Argentina) &amp\; <strong>Antoni Gomila</strong><strong> </strong>(Universitat de les Illes Balears\, Spain): <strong>Second person attributions</strong></p>\n<p>Abstract: We will try to clarify in what sense we hold that the second person perspective involves a specific kind of mental attribution\, what kind of mental states can be attributed from this stance\, which content attributions it allows\, and what its limitations are. Our point of departure is that second person interactions are experienced as direct perceptions of another person&rsquo\;s mental states. We can directly see at least some of the other&rsquo\;s intentions\, wantings and emotions because the agent&rsquo\;s expressive bodily movements are contingent upon ours and upon the situation. This perception involves an implicit attribution of that mental state to the agent. In other words\, in the interactions with other people we perceive them as falling under some mental concepts\, more specifically those mental concepts which are involved in the interaction with each other.</p>\n<p>New book: Social Cognition and the Second Person in Human Interaction - 1st Edit (routledge.com)</p>\n<p><strong>Leonhard Schilbach</strong> (Ludwig Maximilians Universit&auml\;t M&uuml\;nchen\, Germany): <strong>Behavioural and neural mechanisms of social interaction: New developments in social neuroscience and implications for the study of psychiatric disorders</strong></p>\n<p>Abstract: Social neuroscience studies the neurobiology of how people make sense of people. Due to conceptual and methodological limitations\, the field has only more recently begun to study social interaction rather than social observation\, which has become known as the development of a "second-person neuroscience" or an "interactive turn" in social neuroscience. These developments have helped to elucidate the behavioural and neural mechanisms of social interactions. Findings to date suggest that the neural mechanisms supporting social interaction differ from those involved in social observation and highlight a role of the so- called &lsquo\;mentalizing network&rsquo\; as important in this distinction. Taking social interaction seriously may also be particularly important for the advancement of the scientific study of different psychiatric conditions\, which are ubiquitously characterized by social impairments.</p>\n<p>The talks and discussion will be in English. You need to registerherein order to get the link and join the Zoom meeting.</p>\n<p>We hope to see you there!&nbsp\;</p>\n\n<p>--</p>\n<p><strong>Marina Trakas</strong> IIF-CONICET Argentina</p>
ORGANIZER;CN=Marina Trakas:
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