The Department of Philosophy at the University of Calgary is hosting its 10th Annual Philosophy Graduate Conference on May 4th and May 5th. The theme of this year&rsquo\;s conference is the epistemology of disagreement. The conference will consist of 4 graduate student talks and two external keynotes. See the schedule below (all times are MT): \;
\nMay 4th\, 2022
\n10:00am - 10:05am
\nOpening Remarks
\n10:05am - 10:55am
\nBelief-Credence Dualism and Epistemic Peer Disagreement
\nJoshua Brecka\, University of Toronto
\n10:55am - 11:00am
\nCoffee Break
\n11:00am - 11:50am
\nConciliationism and the Peer-Undermining Problem
\nKevin Gausselin\, University of Rochester
\n11:50am - 1:00pm
\nLunch Break
\n1:00pm - 2:30pm
\nKeynote Address: Bias\, Disagreement\, and the Perspectival Character of Bias Attributions
\nThomas Kelly\, Princeton University
\nAbstract: In both everyday life and the sciences\, much of our thought and talk about bias seems to be captured by the following idea: a bias involves a systematic departure from a norm. After explaining this idea\, I attempt to demonstrate its theoretical fruitfulness by showing how it illuminates a familiar phenomenon: the fact that accusations of bias often prompt not only denials but also countercharges of bias. In such cases\, a person who disagrees with the original accusation of bias claims that it's actually the accuser who is biased and it's this that explains why they mistakenly think that bias is present even though it isn&rsquo\;t. I explore the circumstances in which we are rationally required to believe that those who disagree with us are not only mistaken but also biased simply because they disagree with us in the way that they do.
\nMay 5th\, 2022
10:00am - 10:05am
Opening Remarks
\n10:05am - 10:55am
\nOpen-Mindedness and the Norm of Inquiry
\nOushinar Nath\, University College London
\n10:55am - 11:00am
\nCoffee Break
\n11:00am - 11:50am
\nDisagreement and Philosophical Progress\,
\nTom Kaspers\, University of St. Andrews
\n11:50am - 1:00pm
\nLunch Break
\n1:00pm - 2:30pm
\nKeynote Address: Preemption and the Problem of the Predatory Expert
\nJennifer Lackey\, Northwestern University
\nAbstract: \;What kind of reasons for belief are provided by the testimony of experts? In a world where we are often inundated with fake news\, misinformation\, and conspiracy theories\, this question is more pressing than ever. A prominent view in the philosophical literature maintains that the reasons provided by experts are preemptive in that they normatively screen off\, or defeat\, other relevant reasons. In this paper\, I raise problems for this conception of expertise\, including a wholly new one that I call the Problem of the Predatory Expert\, which targets both original versions of preemption as well as new\, modified ones that aim to avoid some of the standard objections.
\nWe will be using pre-registration for our event. Please use the following link to register in advance for this meeting: https://tinyurl.com/philconference2022. You will immediately receive an email containing Zoom information that can be used for both days of the conference.
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